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SANDIN v. CONNER: LOCKING OUT
PRISONERS' DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' More commonly known as the Due Pro-
cess Clause, its original purpose was to protect individual rights from ad-
verse government action without proper procedure.2 The mission of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1 (1986).
2. ROTUNDA et al., supra note 1, § 17.1. The Due Process Clause protects individuals
from procedurally deficient government restrictions on freedom. Id. Due process inquir-
ies focus on the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" due process rights.
See generally Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1048 (1968) (discussing the grants and limitations of rights under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments). Substantive due process protects specific fundamental rights and
safeguards individuals from arbitrary governmental limitations on their freedoms. Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 1, § 17.1. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause effec-
tuates certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights by preventing state legislatures from
enacting legislation which denies such rights. Id. For example, should the state legislature
attempt to enact a law denying the freedom of speech, substantive due process safeguards
would protect this right of free speech. Id.
Once recognized, a substantive due process right cannot be withheld or violated without
the required "process" of law. Id. This theory of "procedural" due process requires that,
whenever the government seeks to exercise its power to deprive an individual of a funda-
mental right, procedural protections attach "to determine the basis for, and legality of,
such action." Id. After determining that a substantive due process right exists,. a court
must examine the nature of the process that is "due." Id The government's burden of
observing procedural due process requirements does not, however, attach because an indi-
vidual finds a specific deprivation unfavorable. See id. Only those deprivations which af-
fect an individual's "life, liberty or property" require due process. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that an individual is protected from government action that im-
pinges on "life, liberty, or property"). Case law establishes the proper procedures that
states must follow to prevent the unfair deprivation of individual rights. Id. For an histori-
cal account of the court's development of procedural due process prior to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original
Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 339 (1987).
While an individual may be deprived of his physical liberty for a certain period of time,
the government must provide a trial to ensure that all existing procedures are followed.
ROTUNDA et al., supra note 1, § 17.1. In other actions, such as the regulation of certain
activities or the withdrawal of government benefits, the government must fulfill procedural
due process requirements, but may do so with less process protections than are afforded at
trial. Id. Whatever the degree of protection, due process requires that the procedure be
"fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of the factual and legal basis for
government actions which deprive him of life, liberty or property." Id. § 17.8, at 259.
On the issue of what rights individuals possess, philosopher Ronald Dworkin writes:
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Due Process Clause is to ensure fundamental fairness.3 Fundamental
fairness requires that an individual has an opportunity to be heard,
thereby limiting the risk of error in the government's decision-making
process.4 Due process analysis entails two steps.5 First, a court examines
whether due process safeguards should attach to a given situation.6 If
they should, a court must determine which procedures to apply.7 The
Constitution states that the recognition of a valid liberty interest is one
situation that triggers the right to due process protections. 8
It is much in dispute, of course, what particular rights citizens have. Does the
acknowledged right to free speech, for example, include the right to participate in
nuisance demonstrations? In practice the Government will have the last word on
what an individual's rights are, because its police will do what its officials and
courts say. But that does not mean that the Government's view is necessarily the
correct view; anyone who thinks it does must believe that men and women have
only such moral rights as Government chooses to grant, which means that they
have no moral rights at all.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RirHTs SERIOUSLY 184-85 (1977).
3. See ROTUNDA et al., supra note 1, § 17.1.
4. Thompson H. Gooding, Jr., The Impact of Entitlement Analysis: Due Process in
Correctional Administrative Hearings, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 151, 153 (1981); see ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, § 17.1 (discussing the fundamental fairness purpose in due process
jurisprudence).
5. Gooding, supra note 4, at 153.
6. See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)
(analyzing procedural due process inquiries in two steps: (1) whether a liberty interest
exists, and (2) whether the due process procedures were constitutionally sufficient);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 222, 223 (1976) (stating that the initial inquiry is whether a
"liberty" interest is implicated before evaluating the amount of process due); Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (stating that the first stage of
due process inquiry begins with the nature of the interest at stake before evaluating the
form of a hearing required); see also Gooding, supra note 4, at 153 (describing the two-part
procedural due process inquiry).
7. See supra note 6; supra note 2 (discussing the distinction between "substantive"
and "procedural" due process and the court's order of analysis in a due process inquiry);
see also Edward L. Rubin, Generalizing the Trial Model of Procedural Due Process: A New
Basis for the Right to Treatment, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 61, 68-73 (1982) (providing a
detailed distinction between the concepts of "substantive" and "procedural" due process).
8. Gooding, supra note 4, at 153. The meaning of the word "liberty" does not dictate
specific examples of freedom or individual choice. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 13.4(a) (3d ed. 1986). The notion of a "liberty" interest is the most signifi-
cant limitation on state action against individual rights. See id. "Liberty," as mentioned in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the prominent theme in those provisions. Id.
The Court recognizes these provisions as being" 'incorporated' into the due process clause
as well as 'fundamental rights' which are derived either from the concept of liberty or other
constitutional values." Id. These rights provide "substantive prohibitions of government
actions which would violate those rights." Id. The essence of procedural due process anal-
ysis centers around initially determining what types of freedom of action or liberty inter-
ests the government cannot limit without fair procedure, and then deciding what level of
procedure is necessary to ensure fair deprivation. Id. The notion of a "liberty interest"
may be sub-divided into three categories of governmental deprivation or restraint: "(1)
physical freedom, (2) the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, and (3) other forms
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Prisoners' Due Process Claims
Unlike other substantive areas of law, the historical development of
due process jurisprudence, and its application to prisoners' rights, oc-
curred relatively recently.9 Its origin traces only to the late 1960s. 1° Prior
of freedom of choice or action." Id. Although the Due Process Clause focuses on proce-
dures used to convict criminal defendants, due process safeguards extend from criminal
matters to all government deprivations of liberty. See id. As Nowak noted, "[i]ndeed the
protection of physical liberty is the oldest and most widely recognized part of the [due
process] guarantee." Id. § 13.4(b).
9. Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners' Rights, 59 FED. PROBATION 36, 36
(1995).
10. Id. The explosion of prisoners' lawsuits over the past 30 years is linked directly to
the rapid increase in the United States prison population as a whole. DAVID RUDOVSKY
ET AL., THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, at xi (4th ed.
1988). It has been suggested that, given this population increase, the explosion of prison-
ers' rights suits concerning confinement conditions was necessary to avoid intolerable con-
ditions. Id. Such suggestion went so far as to analogize prison conditions with Dante's
depiction of Hell in his novel, The Inferno. Id.
Title 42, § 1983 of the U.S. Code provides for a civil action for a deprivation of rights and
states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Under § 1983, prisoners may file civil suits in federal court against
a prison or jail challenging conditions of their confinement. Id. If successful, the prisoner
may be awarded money damages or other relief. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K.
DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION
1983 LITIGATION 1 (1995). A range of constitutional claims have arisen under § 1983. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974-75 (1994) (concerning the protection of inmates
from violence by fellow inmates); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (providing
protection for prisoners from excessive force by prison officers); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (raising the issue of adequate medical treatment); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974) (challenging due process procedure in disciplinary proceed-
ings); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (addressing prisoners' asserted
right to prison law library access).
Most § 1983 lawsuits are filed in federal court, although state courts may resolve these
claims. HANSON & DALEY, supra, at 1 n.1. Representing an enormous portion of the
United States district court system's civil docket, one in every 10 civil lawsuits is a § 1983
lawsuit. Id. at iii. The increase in § 1983 suits by prisoners has sparked debate among
judges, attorneys, and other experts concerning the necessity and practicality of burdening
the federal courts with these complaints. Id. at 3. One position that former Supreme
Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Federal Courts Study Committee, and advo-
cates of federalism argued, contends that § 1983 prisoners' lawsuits are a waste of scarce
judicial resources, comparing them to cases in small claims court. Id. at 3-4. Contrasting
this position, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Harry Blackmun, some federal
judges, and advocates of prisoners' rights, contend that the extraordinary demand on fed-
eral courts to adjudicate § 1983 cases is overestimated. Id. at 4. Furthermore, Justice
Blackmun recognized that these claims cannot adequately be deemed "frivolous or merito-
rious" before heard in federal court. See id. Indeed, Justice Blackmun asserted that fed-
eral courts need to "leave their doors open to all state prisoners" and refrain from
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to that time, the Supreme Court avoided significant involvement in due
process rights of prisoners.1 Disciplinary rules and procedures governing
prison communities were immune from traditional judiciary review, the
rationale being that prison discipline was a matter solely for the discre-
tion of prison officials.' 2 But, because prison officials were the final arbi-
ters of prisoners' grievances, unfair and arbitrary punishment of inmates
remained common and unchecked.' 3
"siphon[ing] lawsuits off to some other dispute resolution forum," because of the potential
for partisan results when a state court is forced to review the actions of its state prison. Id.
at 4-5; see generally M. GLENN ABERNATHY & BARBARA A. PERRY, CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 166-67 (6th ed. 1993) (discussing the Supreme Court decisions
that have developed the area of prisoners' rights law).
11. Call, supra note 9, at 36. The Court's abstention may be attributed to its unwilling-
ness to usurp the functions of the legislative and executive branches of government, no-
tions of federalism, a lack of understanding of the efficient operations of prisons, an
unwillingness to interfere with state court jurisdiction over state prisons, or a fear of a
flood of frivolous lawsuits from prisoners. Id. This "hands-off" period raised the question
whether prisoners had any constitutional rights at all. As Professor Michael Mushlin
noted, the "Constitution did not breach prison walls for over 170 years." 1 MICHAEL B.
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.02, at 7 (2d ed. 1993). Advocates of prisoners' rights,
like the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), contend that this lack of judicial re-
sponsibility reflected the prevailing attitude that the purpose of incarceration was punish-
ment. RUDOVSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at xii. This judicial attitude "reinforced the status
quo of prison life" and, because no other political or social organizations intervened, the
prison system remained insulated from public opinion and judicial management. Id. The
"hands-off" period, therefore, emerged as a result of deference to the management deci-
sions of prison officials. Id. at xii-xiii.
12. SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL § 18 (1976); see supra note 11 and accompanying text (illustrating the reasons
why the Court was reluctant to interfere in prisoners' due process cases).
13. See KRANTZ, supra note 12, § 18. Courts adhered to the "hands-off" doctrine even
when a prisoner's safety was at risk. MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 1.02. In one such case,
inmates sought to litigate the dangerous conditions of their confinement, arguing that con-
finement in a room with a coal stove presented a dangerous risk of fire without any means
of retreat. Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 286-87 (D. Alaska 1951). Although the
court agreed with the classification of this condition as a "fabulous obscenity," id. at 287,
the judge felt powerless to act because of the "hands-off" doctrine. See id. at 289. Miscon-
duct sanctions that prison officials imposed during this era ranged in severity, and "in-
clud[ed] verbal reprimands, loss of privileges, solitary confinement, transfer to another
institution where the conditions of confinement were more onerous, and indefinite segre-
gation in a maximum security unit within the prison." Charles H. Jones, Jr. & Edward
Rhine, Due Process and Prison Disciplinary Practices: From Wolff to Hewitt, 11 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 44, 52-53 (1985). Due process uniformity was virtually
nonexistent because few restrictions as to the severity or length of sanctions existed and
" '[u]ncertainty, even more than exemplary punishment .... was a major factor of control
in the traditional prison.' " Id. at 52 n.41 (quoting McClearly, Communication Patterns as
Bases of Systems of Authority and Power, in R.A. CLOWARD, THEORETICAL STUDIES IN
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON (Social Science Research Council, pamphlet no.
15, 1960)).
Critics have advanced a separation of powers argument to justify strict adherence to the
"hands-off" doctrine. See generally Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional
Prisoners' Due Process Claims
In the landmark case of Wolff v. McDonnell,'4 the Supreme Court
abandoned its "hands-off" approach to prisoners' due process claims.
Prisoners and their advocates took notice of the Court's entrance into this
activist or "rights" period. 5 Prisoner lawsuits complaining about their
conditions of confinement increased exponentially, creating a significant
burden on federal dockets in recent years.' 6 Unfortunately, this flood of
litigation has overburdened already stressed federal judicial resources.' 7
Commentators have argued that the courts themselves are to blame for
this deluge of prisoners' lawsuits by "undertaking complex enforcement
efforts and by expanding the standing to sue."' Regardless of who is to
Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795,
797; Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 512 (1963). Traditionally, management and control
of correctional facilities were the responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches
of government. MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 1.02. As a result, courts were unwilling to
dictate how the government should run its prisons. Id. The courts likely faced federalism
concerns as well, and, therefore, were reluctant to dictate to the states how to manage their
prisoners. Id. Judicial inexperience, a general lack of expertise with prison management,
and a heavy judicial workload, also may have influenced the courts' hesitation to address
prisoner claims. Id.
14. 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussing
Wolff's holding and impact on the area of prisoners' rights).
15. See Call, supra note 9, at 36-37.
16. Robert G. Doumar, Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits: A Pompous Delusion, 11 GEO.
MASON U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988). The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) re-
corded only 218 § 1983 cases in 1966, which was the first year that the AO counted prison-
ers' rights cases in a separate category. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 10, at 1-2. By 1992,
the total prisoners rights cases had escalated to 26,824. Id. at 2. It is estimated that there is
approximately one lawsuit for every 30 state inmates; in a state prison population of about
80,000 inmates, the number of § 1983 lawsuits roughly would number 26,000 to 28,000. Id.
at 2-3.
17. Doumar, supra note 16, at 6. Over the last 20 years, the number of prisoner law-
suits has increased rapidly. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 435 (1993). Because of recent sentenc-
ing reforms, the number of incarcerated individuals undoubtedly will increase, thus raising
the number of prisoners' rights suits. Id. at 419.
18. Doumar, supra note 16, at 11. Both Doumar and Mushlin trace the explosion of
prisoners' litigation to political, judicial, and societal developments in the 1960s. Id; see
MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 1.03. Prisoners were becoming much more militant and asser-
tive, particularly in the case of those belonging to the Black Muslim organization. Id.
These prisoners opened the door to increased prison litigation for First Amendment reli-
gious rights and other related issues. Id. (citing Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp.
370 (D.D.C. 1962); Brown v. McGinnis, 180 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1962)). Additionally, gov-
ernment and private foundations provided funding for civil liberties litigation which other-
wise would not have been economically feasible. Id.
At the judicial level during the 1960s, the Supreme Court expanded individual rights
greatly through many landmark decisions. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969) (providing free speech protection); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (recog-
nizing protection for the free exercise of religion); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
19961 1105
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"blame" for the proliferation of prisoners' constitutional claims, the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area both have enlightened and con-
fused the landscape of prisoners' due process jurisprudence. 9 From the
landmark decision of Wolff v. McDonnell,20 through twenty years of pris-
oners' rights decisions,2' the Court has struggled to balance individual
prisoners' rights with the exigencies of prison administration, and has
searched for a due process formula which will allow everyone involved a
just balance.
In Sandin v. Conner,22 the Court redefined the methodology for recog-
nizing liberty interests and reconsidered the types of deprivations that
(1955) (establishing protection against racial discrimination in public education); see also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishing Fourth Amendment protection for
privacy interests); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (finding a right to counsel at
a lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating a right to warnings before
custodial interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
rule applies to the states and bars illegally seized evidence). By enforcing constitutional
rights, particularly for those "discrete and insular minorities" previously lacking access to
the political process, the Court effectively communicated to prisoners that their constitu-
tional claims would be considered. MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 1.03 (citing Justice Stone's
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(describing groups with the greatest need for judicial protection)).
TWo famous judicial comments marked the collapse of the traditional "hands-off" doc-
trine which had permitted the significant abuse of prisoners' constitutional rights toward
prisoners. MUSHIN, supra note 11, § 1.03. In a renowned statement that "sounded the
death knell to the "hands-off" doctrine," Justice White declared: "[Tihere is no Iron Cur-
tain between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." Id. at 9 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)). One year later, Justice
Powell further undermined the hands-off doctrine and embraced constitutional guarantees
for prisoners by proclaiming:
[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of
valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When
a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee,
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.
Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)).
19. Barry R. Bell, Note, Prisoners' Rights, Institutional Needs, and the Burger Court,
72 VA. L. REv. 161, 166 (1986).
20. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (administrative segregation);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (inmate transfer to a mental hospital); Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole entitlements);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer to prison with less favorable conditions);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (good-time credits for parole release); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation).
22. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
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invoke due process safeguards.23 In Sandin, prisoner DeMont Conner 24
alleged that the petitioner and other Hawaii prison officials denied him
procedural due process rights.25 During an adjustment committee hear-
ing on charges of misconduct, officials denied Conner's request to call
witnesses he claimed would have proven his innocence.26 Subsequently,
the committee found him guilty of the misconduct charges.27
23. See id. at 2295 (stating "[wie granted certiorari to re-examine the circumstances
under which state prison regulations afford inmates a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause").
24. Id. DeMont Conner was convicted of a multitude of offenses, including murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and burglary and was serving a sentence of 30 years to life. Id. Con-
ner was incarcerated in the Halawa Correctional Facility, a maximum-security prison in
Oahu, Hawaii. Id.
25. Id. at 2296. Conner's claim sought to establish, based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment due process right, a liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segrega-
tion. Id. Conner did not challenge his disciplinary sentence on the basis of the Eighth
Amendment, which protects the individual against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. Solitary confinement, or punitive segregation, has a long tradition in
this country. MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 2.02. Officials use this type of punishment for the
most serious violations of prison rules. Id.; see BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A
STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO 1915 1-16 (1968) (dating the historical
use of solitary confinement as a punishment to the early nineteenth century); Thomas 0.
Murton, Prison Management. The Past, The Present, and the Possible Future, in PRISONS:
PRESENT AND POSSIBLE 5, 9 (Marvin E. Wolfgang ed. 1979) (describing solitary confine-
ment as a pervasive punishment). The potential for physical and mental harm to inmates
restricted to solitary confinement has been well documented. MUSHLIN, supra note 11,
§ 2.02. For a discussion of the physical, emotional, and psychological effects of solitary
confinement, see generally Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as
Psychological Punishment, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 265 (1977); Maria A. Luise, Note, Solitary
Confinement. Legal and Psychological Considerations, 15 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 301 (1989).
26. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. The misconduct charges at issue resulted from an Au-
gust 13, 1987 incident when Conner was escorted from his cell to the module program area
to attend a religious service. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.
Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911). During a strip search that he believed was abusive and
degrading, Conner became irate and obstructed the search. Id. He was charged with using
"physical interference or obstacle resulting in the obstruction, hindrance, or impairment of
the performance of a correctional function by a public servant"; this act was classified as a
high misconduct offense. Id. at 8. In addition, Conner was charged with using "abusive or
obscene language to a staff member," and engaging in "[h]arassment of employees"; both
of these acts were classified as "low moderate" misconduct charges. Id.
The committee denied Conner's request to call witnesses because " '[w]itnesses were
unavailable due to move [sic] to the medium facility and being short staffed on the mod-
ules.' " Sandin, 115 S. Ct at 2296, (alterations in original).
27. Id. Conner was found guilty, and sentenced to 30 days disciplinary segregation in
the Special Holding Unit for a physical obstruction charge, and four hours segregation for
the lower misconduct charges, to be served concurrently. Id. The Special Holding Unit
holds inmates assigned to disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and protec-
tive custody. Id. at 2296 n.2. Inmates confined in disciplinary segregation receive the same
privileges as those in administrative segregation except they receive one less phone call
and visiting privilege. Id.
1996] 1107
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Conner initially sought administrative review of the committee's find-
ing, but before the appeal was reviewed, he filed a federal civil rights
action alleging that the committee violated his constitutional right to pro-
cedural due process during the disciplinary hearing.2" The district court
granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment.29 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court's judgment, concluding that Conner possessed a liberty in-
terest in being free from disciplinary segregation, and questioned whether
he received the due process protections Wolff v. McDonnell afforded.3 °
This Note first traces the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of
prisoners' due process rights. This Note explains the development of
prisoners' due process jurisprudence and its resulting effects on both fun-
damental individual rights and prison administration. Next, while dis-
cussing the addition of Sandin v. Conner to the landscape of prisoners'
due process cases, this Note criticizes the impact of the majority's deci-
sion to return to the original due process methodology. This Note exam-
ines the return to the "nature of the deprivation" methodology31 and
questions the majority's application of the new methodology to the fac-
tual circumstances in Sandin. Finally, this Note analyzes the Sandin deci-
sion and predicts its impact on the lower courts and the future of
prisoners' litigation of liberty interests under the Due Process Clause.
28. Id. at 2296.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1994). The Ninth Circuit based its
decision on a Hawaii prison regulation that required the committee to find guilt when
substantial evidence supported a misconduct charge. Id. That regulation states:
"Upon completion of the hearing, the committee may take the matter under
advisement and render a decision based upon evidence presented at the hearing
to which the individual had an opportunity to respond or any cumulative evidence
which may subsequently come to light may be used as a permissible inference of
guilt, although disciplinary action shall be based upon more than mere silence. A
finding of guilt shall be made where:
(1) The inmate or ward admits the violation or pleads guilty.
(2) The charge is supported by substantial evidence."
Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296-97 n.3 (citing Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-18(b)(2) (1983)). Ap-
plying the test set forth in Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454
(1989), for determining whether limits have been placed on official discretion in the imple-
mentation of a state regulation, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the language of § 17-201-18(b)
and determined that if the committee did not find substantial evidence of misconduct or
the inmate did not admit guilt, it did not have the discretion to find guilt; thus, disciplinary
segregation was not justified. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466.
31. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The phrase "nature of the
deprivation" is a term of art used in traditional due process analysis, which requires a court
to examine the severity, in degree and kind, of the deprivation before determining it wor-
thy of due process protection. Id.
1108 [Vol. 45:1101
1996] Prisoners' Due Process Claims 1109
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRISONERS' DUE PROCESS ISSUES
In the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,32 the Supreme Court ex-
tended procedural due process protection to state welfare benefits.33
This extension effectively elevated such state benefits from privileges to
liberty interests. 4 Moreover, the decision initiated an onslaught of due
process litigation by prisoners seeking the full panoply of procedural due
process rights.35 After Goldberg, the Supreme Court began to intervene
in the area of prisoners' rights, specifically addressing prisoners' rights as
they applied to internal disciplinary proceedings. 6
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. Id. at 261-62. In Goldberg, the Court held that welfare benefits created a statutory
entitlement for qualified persons and, thus, could not be terminated until procedural due
process was provided through a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. Id. at 262-64. The
Goldberg holding triggered extensive due process litigation and motivated state prisoners
to file federal claims based on their new found right to "some kind of hearing." See Henry
J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267-68, 1299-1304 (1975)
(discussing Goldberg and its impact); Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural
Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
482, 489-525 (1984) (discussing Goldberg and due process cases following). Professor Her-
man has been summarized as arguing that the notion that "an individual can have no inter-
est cognizable under the due process clause unless state law or practice has positively
created one ... [is] historically and philosophically wrong." Id. at 482; see also infra notes
163-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Sandin majority's problem with a methodol-
ogy that focuses on state created law or practice to determine a liberty interest).
34. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 361-62. The notion of a liberty interest istaken directly
from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1. The initial question in any due process claim is whether a life, liberty or
property interest is involved. See, e.g., Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (following the two part
due process analysis that requires finding a liberty interest implicated before considering
what process is due); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976) (same); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (same); see also NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.4, at
523-27 (further discussing the concept of a liberty interest and explaining the two part
analysis for due process inquiries in prisoners' rights cases); Jay P. Kesan & Stephanie L.
Teicher, Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. L.J. 1461, 1482 (1995) (discuss-
ing the two-part analysis for due process inquiries). The Constitution, a court order, state
statutes, treaties, regulations, or general policies and customs may create liberty interests.
Id at 1482-83.
35. See Herman, supra note 33, at 489-525 (elaborating on this new litigation).
36. See Mushlin, supra note 11, § 9.03 (discussing the Court's intervention in internal
disciplinary proceedings). Although judicial attention toward prisoners' constitutional
rights was replacing the hands-off period slowly, these early victories for prisoners involved
cases of major abuse involving "severe physical punishment." RUDOVSKY, ET AL. supra
note 10, at xiii. The ACLU criticized the demise of the hands-off doctrine because neither
"judicial activism" nor the necessary review of administrative decisions of 'poorly trained
personnel who deal directly with prisoners' followed it. Id.
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Wolff v. McDonnell37 marked the Supreme Court's first extension of
procedural due process rights to prison disciplinary proceedings.38 Wolff,
although not the first case to discuss prisoners' rights, became the stan-
dard by which more than thirty subsequent Supreme Court decisions ad-
dressing the rights of prisoners would be measured.39 Although the
fundamental law of Wolff has remained intact, subsequent decisions illus-
trate the Court's movement away from traditional judicial interpretations
towards a closer reliance on statutory language. 40
A. A Precursor to Wolff: Morrissey v. Brewer and the "Grievous
Loss" Analysis
Though Wolff and subsequent case law laid precedential foundation for
the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner,4' the Court initiated
its prisoner due process jurisprudence two years prior to Wolff, in Morris-
sey v. Brewer.42 In Morrissey, the petitioners brought habeas corpus pro-
ceedings based on due process claims, demanding a hearing before having
their paroles revoked.43
The Morrissey Court examined whether the specific circumstances of
parole revocations warranted due process protection.44 This examination
required the Court to analyze the degree to which a person would be
37. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
38. See id. at 558 (requiring due process protection when prison officials make the
determination to take a prisoner's good-time credits away because of serious misconduct).
39. See MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 1.04, at 12 (marking Wolff as the beginning of the
explosion of Supreme Court involvement with prisoners' due process litigation); see also
Call, supra note 9, at 36-38 (discussing the relatively recent emergence of litigation of pris-
oners' rights through the application of due process law); supra note 21 (citing significant
prisoner due process decisions).
40. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983) (focusing exclusively on state
regulations as the basis for finding a liberty interest).
41. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
42. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
43. Id. at 474. The prisoners filed petitions in district court after exhausting state rem-
edies. Id. The district court, however, followed controlling authority which stated that
failure to provide inmates with hearings before parole revocation was not violative of the
Due Process Clause. Id. In a four to three decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that due process required no such hearing. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit, recognizing that parolees rely on an "implicit promise"
that parole will be revoked only if they violate conditions imposed upon them. Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 482; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-9,
10-10 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Morrissey and the idea of the parolee's liberty interest
stemming from an "implicit promise"); Herman, supra note 33, at 505-06 (discussing the
"implicit promise").
44. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82.
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'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' The Court recognized that because
a parolee possesses a liberty interest in parole, and because its subse-
quent termination would inflict a "grievous loss" on the parolee, it fell
appropriately within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. a6
The Court weighed the interests of the state in returning parolees to con-
finement without the burden of a "new adversary criminal trial" against
the interests of the parolee in remaining free; finding the interests of the
parolee paramount, the state was required to implement procedural due
process protections.47
Morrissey was a significant victory for prisoners because it mandated
specific procedural safeguards necessary to ensure the constitutionality of
a parole hearing.as Morrissey, and the resulting application of rather ex-
45. Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court evaluated whether any process was
due by examining the extent to which the individual would have suffered a "grievous loss,"
id., an analysis adopted in 1951 in McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262-63 (1970). The focus on "grievous loss" as a
due process determinant replaced previous criteria focusing upon the categorization of a
benefit as a "right" or a "privilege." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (citing Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).
46. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482; see Kesan & Teicher. supra note 34, at 1482-85 (dis-
cussing the sources of liberty interests); infra note 88 (explaining the distinction between a
state conferred liberty interest and an inherent liberty interest).
47. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-84. The Court recognized several of the state's interests
in parole matters. Id. at 483. The state had an interest in stringent restrictions on an
individual's liberty in order to prevent subsequent crime. Id. Additionally, the Court rec-
ognized the state's interest in returning parolees to prison without costly and time-consum-
ing procedural burdens. Id. The Court balanced these concerns with society's interest in
treating the parolee with basic fairness, however, and stated, "we [are not] persuaded by
the argument that revocation is so totally a discretionary matter that some form of hearing
would be administratively intolerable." Id. By eliminating the prison official's ability to
revoke parole without procedural guarantees, the parolee's rehabilitation may continue,
without arbitrary interference. Id. at 484.
48. The mandated minimal procedural safeguards included: (1) written notice of the
alleged parole violations; (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless good cause is found for disallowing
this right); (5) a "neutral and detached" hearing body (no requirement for members to be
judicial officers or attorneys); and (6) a factfinder's written statement setting forth the
evidence relied upon and reasons for parole revocation. Id. at 488-89. The Court refused
explicitly to decide the issue of whether or not the parolee should be allowed counsel in
this proceeding. Id. at 489. Less than one year after Morrissey, the Court addressed the
issue of probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In
Gagnon, recognizing that there was no real difference between parole revocation and pro-
bation revocation, the Court applied the Morrissey procedural standard and found that a
probationer is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing. Id. at 782. Addition-
ally, the Gagnon Court granted an indigent parolee or probationer a due process right to
counsel on a case-by-case basis to preserve notions of fundamental fairness. See id. at 783,
790.
Catholic University Law Review
tensive procedural safeguards,49 caused the future of prisoners' due pro-
cess protections to appear optimistic.5" In applying constitutional
protections to prisoners in Morrissey, the Supreme Court clearly had de-
parted from its "hands-off" approach. 1
B. Wolff v. McDonnell: A Foundation for Prisoners' Due
Process Inquiry
Wolff v. McDonnell52 is the seminal decision marking the the Supreme
Court's involvement in prisoners' rights.53 Wolff upheld the prisoners'
challenge to the sufficiency of prison officials' discretion in disciplinary
proceedings.54 The case involved a Nebraska statute that provided fixed
criteria for awarding good-time credits, which reduced the length of an
inmate's confinement.5 5 According to the statute, prison officials could
revoke these credits only for "flagrant or serious misconduct. ' 56 If an
inmate breached prison conduct seriously, he could be punished either
through a reduction in good-time credits or confinement in a disciplinary
cell.57 Respondent Wolff, on behalf of himself and other inmates, filed a
complaint for damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Nebraska's prison disciplinary proceedings violated his due
process rights.5 8
49. See id. at 786. The Gagnon Court awarded the probationer all of the procedure
that Morrissey mandated for preliminary and final revocation hearings. Id.
50. See generally Call, supra note 9, at 36-38 (discussing the Court's involvement in
prisoners' due process rights).
51. See id. (outlining the Court's movement from the "hands-off period" to the "rights
period").
52. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
53. MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 9.03 (calling Wolff the Supreme Court's "initial prison
discipline case"); see also Jones & Rhine, supra note 13, at 63 (recognizing Wolffs impact
as a major decision delineating necessary due process in prison disciplinary proceedings).
54. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
55. See id. at 545 n.5 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (cur-
rent version in NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 114.01(2) (1994 & R.S. Supp. 1995))); infra note 57
(citing Nebraska statutory language that established the required standard of misconduct
that governing revocation of good-time credits).
56. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546.
57. Id. at 546-47. The Nebraska statute granted responsibility for inmate discipline to
the chief executive officer of the particular facility and provided for a range of disciplinary
actions:
Except in flagrant or serious cases, punishment for misconduct shall consist of
deprivation of privileges. In cases of flagrant or serious misconduct, the chief
executive officer may order that a person's reduction of term as provided in sec-
tion 83-1,107 [good time credits] be forfeited or withheld and also that the person
be confined in a disciplinary cell.
Id. at 545 n.5.
58. Id. at 542-43. Additionally, Respondents' claim alleged that the inmate legal
assistance program did not meet constitutional standards and that regulations concerning
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The district court rejected the procedural due process claim,59 but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed with re-
spect to the due process claim.6 ° The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's due process decision holding that, although the Due Process
Clause did not create an inherent liberty interest in credit for good be-
havior, the relevant state statutory provisions created a liberty interest in
a shortened prison sentence, which only a showing of serious misconduct
could revoke.61 Because prisoners in Nebraska could lose good-time
credits only for "serious" misconduct, the classification of such conduct
became crucial.62 The Wolff Court asserted that minimum due process
safeguards were necessary to protect against prison officials making arbi-
trary or retaliatory classifications. 63
Although the Wolff Court held that appropriate procedural safeguards
were necessary before a liberty interest could be terminated, the Court
did not mandate the full range of procedures it had established in Morris-
sey.' 4 Instead, the Court relied upon a "mutual accommodation" or bal-
ancing test that weighed prison administrative needs against the
prisoner's individual rights.65 The Wolff Court's balancing test contrib-
inspection of mail between attorney and inmate were unconstitutionally restrictive. Id. at
543.
59. McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616,628 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
60. McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 544. The Eighth Circuit followed precedent
outlined in Morrissey regarding proper due process procedures, but left the issue of the
circumstances under which counsel would be required to the district court on remand. Id.;
supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing the background and holding of Mor-
rissey); see supra notes 48-49 (discussing the background and holding of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, which additionally considered the issue of counsel).
61. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
62. Id.
63. See id.; see also JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 8.3
(4th ed. 1991) (noting that courts have granted relief when prison administrators acted
arbitrarily or with capriciousness). The Supreme Court became involved in prison discipli-
nary proceedings in order to prevent prison officials from acting in a "capricious" and
"arbitrary" manner, which occurred often prior to Wolff. See, e.g., Howard v. Smyth, 365
F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir.) (holding that, absent a hearing, an inmate's placement in solitary
confinement for activities associated with requests for religious services was arbitrary pun-
ishment), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966); see also Jones & Rhine, supra note 13, at 52-53
(summarizing sanctions prison officials can utilize).
64. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 559-60; see supra notes 42-51 (providing background and hold-
ing of Morrissey); supra notes 48-49 (providing background and holding of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, decided shortly after Morrissey).
65. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The Court considered whether prisoners' issues should be
addressed in light of individual constitutional rights or penal system objectives. Id. The
Court in favoring the prisoner's argument concluded, "though his rights may be diminished
by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly
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uted significantly to prisoners' due process law, even more so than its
focus on defining liberty interests.66
The Wolff Court distinguished Morrissey with regard to disciplinary
proceedings, and recognized an important state interest in controlling the
structure and content of prison disciplinary hearings.67 As a result, the
significance of Wolff lies not in what procedures the Court stated were
constitutionally required, but rather what was not required. 68 The Court
applied the procedural requirements defined in Morrissey to a degree,
but did not mandate a prisoner's right to confrontation and cross-exami-
nation of witnesses at disciplinary proceedings, nor did it provide for even
a qualified right to counsel. 69 The Court wanted to avoid "encasing the
disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional straightjacket" and
distinguished disciplinary procedures from those necessary in a criminal
trial.7" Instead, the Court adopted lesser procedural requirements, ex-
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime." Id. at 555; see
supra note 18 (setting forth Justice White's now famous quote hailing support for inmates'
constitutional rights). Though Wolffs impact was viewed as a victory for prisoners' due
process law, the Supreme Court only endorsed a qualified right to call witnesses at a disci-
plinary hearing, stating that witnesses should be permitted if calling them will not be "un-
duly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; see
JAMES J. GOBERT & NEIL P. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 8.05 (1981). In rejecting the
absolute right to call witnesses, the Wolff Court's decision did little to end unfettered dis-
cretion in deciding whether to allow the inmate's request for witnesses. See id.
66. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995) (making this observation). The
Wolff Court's brief discussion of the definition of a liberty interest set the stage for a more
detailed discussion of the issue in Meachum v. Fano. Id.; see infra notes 82-90 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Meachum Court's analysis of what constitutes a liberty inter-
est); supra note 8 (providing background discussion on the notion of a liberty interest).
67. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-63. The Wolff Court stated "the major consideration mili-
tating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged
parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the
prison disciplinary hearing." Id. at 561. The Court went on to distinguish prison discipli-
nary proceedings from parole revocation hearings, the former taking place in a "closed,
tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal
law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so." Id. The Court cited repeat
offenders, overall tension, frustration, despair, and close contact between guards and in-
mates as reasons for leaving the structuring of prison disciplinary proceedings to the prison
authorities. Id. at 561-62.
68. See PALMER, supra note 63, § 8.3, at 111 (illustrating that the prisoner has no abso-
lute constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; it necessarily
must depend on prison officials' discretion). Because of its avoidance of establishing due
process guidelines precisely, experts have criticized the Wolff decision for " 'fail[ing] to
make the constitution [sic] a living document for many human beings,' by not requiring
additional procedural rights in the prison context." Id. (quoting Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F.
Supp. 1222 (W.D. Wis. 1974)) (footnote omitted).
69. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-72. The Court determined that neither the right to retained
nor appointed counsel was necessary in prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 569-70.
70. Id. at 563.
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cluding the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to decrease the
level of confrontation between prison staff and inmates, and to advance
the rehabilitative goals of the penal institution.71
While Wolff signaled the Court's willingness to apply constitutional
protections to liberty interests arising out of state statutes, this trend to-
ward awarding more procedural rights to prisoners started to decline
soon after it began.72 In an important footnote, the Wolff majority, how-
ever, expressed its willingness to apply, the same procedural safeguards
afforded to deprivations of good-time credits to discipline imposed
through solitary confinement.73 Although Wolff established important
constitutional guidelines for recognizing prisoners' liberty and signified a
moderate pro-prisoner holding, prison officials retained a substantial
amount of flexibility in disciplinary proceedings.74
C. Predicates for Protection: The Beginning of Statutory Reliance in
Meachum v. Fano
In Meachum v. Fano,7 the Supreme Court examined whether due pro-
cess entitled a convicted state prisoner to a hearing prior to his transfer to
71. See id. (taking these confrontation. and rehabilitation factors into account when
evaluating Nebraska's procedure). Justice Marshall dissented, stating that, without the en-
forceable right to call witnesses, present documentary evidence, or confront and cross-
examine witnesses, "the inmate is afforded no means to challenge the word of his accusers.
Without these procedures, a disciplinary board cannot resolve disputed factual issues in
any rational or accurate way." Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Terrence J. Flem-
ing, Note, Noble Holding As Empty Promises: Minimum Due Process at Prison Discipli-
nary Hearings, 7 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 145, 168-73 (1981) (suggesting that the Court
should reconsider Wolff as to the appropriate amount of process due at prison disciplinary
hearings).
72. See Call, supra note 9, at 38-39 (illustrating that abandoning the "hands-off" doc-
trine did not lead directly to judicial advocacy of all prisoners' claims).
73. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571-72 n.19. The Court also stated that solitary confinement
should be reserved for punishment of serious misbehavior. Id. The Court took further
measures to categorize solitary confinement as a "major change in the conditions of con-
finement," and recognized the need for minimum procedural safeguards to protect against
"arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition" of the punishment under
the statute. Id. In his brief to the Supreme Court, DeMont Conner relied on this footnote
from Wolff as a firmly established principle dictating due process guarantees for discipli-
nary proceedings. Respondent's Brief at 11, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No.
93-1911).
74. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571-72. The Wolff Court decided that in disciplinary hear-
ings, prisoners should be guaranteed the following due process protections: advance writ-
ten notice of the alleged violation, a written statement of the evidence the factfinder relied
on, and a conditional right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (subject to
official discretion as to prison safety and correctional goals). Id. at 563-66; see PALMER,
supra note 63, § 8.3 (illustrating the impact of Wolff on prisoners' rights and criticism of
this holding).
75. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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another prison facility.76 Although the facts in Meachum were similar to
Wolff, suggesting application of the Wolff standard, no state statute or
practice existed in Meachum that created a liberty interest, requiring seri-
ous nisconduct to be found before a prisoner could be transferred.77
The misconduct that sparked the due process claim in Meachum
stemmed from repeated acts of arson within a medium-security prison
which resulted in officials transferring several prisoners suspected of be-
ing involved in the fires to a maximum-security prison.78 Though the
Classification Board held hearings individually with each prisoner, the
prisoners claimed that the lack of "adequate factfinding hearing[s]" de-
nied them liberty without due process of law.79
Applying Wolff, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that the prisoners' hearings and notice were not con-
stitutionally sufficient, and ordered them returned to the general prison
population until the prison officials complied with proper procedure.8°
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,81 holding that a transfer to a
maximum-security facility constituted a "significant modification of the
overall conditions of confinement. ' 82 The court found that this modifica-
tion, by itself, was sufficient to trigger due process requirements.83
The Supreme Court reversed, noting initially that the Due Process
Clause does not prevent "any change in the conditions of confinement
having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner., 84 Furthermore, the
Court held that "the Due Process Clause in and of itself [did not] protect
a duly convicted prisoner against [intrastate prison] transfer[s]. ' '85 The
Court reasoned that the transfer, although the prisoner disliked it, was
76. Id. at 216. The new prison's conditions were substantially less favorable to the
prisoner than his previous facility. Id.
77. Id. at 226-27.
78. Id. at 216. Nine serious fires were reported within a two and one half month pe-
riod at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute at Norfolk. Id Six respondent inmates
were removed from the general prison population after reports from informants. Id. A
Classification Board met to decide on a recommendation of administrative segregation or a
transfer to a maximum-security facility; no loss of good-time credits or any period of disci-
plinary segregation was applied. Id. at 216-18, 222.
79. Id. at 217-22.
80. Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir.
1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Additionally, the court ordered prison officials to pro-
mulgate regulations establishing procedures governing prisoner transfers based on infor-
mants' testimony. Id.
81. 520 F.2d 374, 380 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
82. Id. at 378.
83. See id. at 378-79 (stating that the modification in conditions affected a liberty inter-
est under the Fourteenth Amendment).
84. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
85. Id. at 225.
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"within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction ha[d]
authorized the State to impose., 8 6
In dictum, the Supreme Court distinguished Wolff, stating that a liberty
interest existed in Wolff because there was a finding of serious miscon-
duct.8 7 The Court rejected the Meachum prisoners' reliance on their
"grievous loss" as the basis for invoking due process, thereby substan-
tially limiting due process protections unless tied to a state regulation. 8
The Court also rejected the inmates' argument that they relied upon, and
expected to remain in, a particular prison as long as they maintained good
behavior.8 9 The Court stated that a prisoner's expectation of remaining
in a certain prison is "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger proce-
dural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to
transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all." 90
86. Id. While affirming Wolffs holding that an inmate retains important rights in
prison, Meachum also emphasized that not all deprivations should trigger due process anal-
ysis or be entitled to judicial scrutiny. Id. at 224-25; Thomas 0. Sargentich, Comment, Two
Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
405, 409-10 (1977).
87. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226-27.
88. See id. at 224 (noting that any "grievous loss" is not necessarily sufficient to make
the procedural protections of Due Process). The Meachum Court "appearfed] to adopt a
narrow statutory entitlement analysis" to determine whether procedural due process was
necessary. Gooding, supra note 4, at 161. In doing so, the Court arguably left open the
possibility of "impact analysis." Id. With this analysis, the nature of the loss, rather than
the statutory entitlement, would be the basis for due process applications. Id. The Court
claimed that reliance on state statutes for applying due process protections" 'insure[d] that
the state-created right [was] not arbitrarily abrogated.' " Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226 (quot-
ing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)) (alterations added). This is consistent
with the due process approaches in prior cases. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573
(1975) (state conferred right established a statutory entitlement); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (same); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (same);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (same); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 249 (1983) (concluding that a state created regulation on prison transfers did not cre-
ate a liberty interest when no standards were established to govern prison officials' deci-
sions). But see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Vitek represents one instance where a
state statute conferring a liberty interest need not be present to invoke Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections. Id. at 494. In Vitek, a prisoner was to be transferred involuntarily from
a prison to a state mental hospital. Id. at 484. The Court held that the prisoner's right to
be free from such a transfer was a liberty interest independent of a state statute; it was
"qualitatively different" from punishment, inherently related to incarceration, and had
"stigmatizing consequences." Id. at 493-94; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (concluding that independent of any state regulation, a prisoner had an in-
herent liberty interest in being protected from involuntary administration of psychotropic
drugs).
89. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
90. Id.; cf. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (discussing the holding of
Meachum, decided on the same day). In Haymes, a prisoner was transferred for circulating
a petition alleging a deprivation of prisoners' right to counsel. Id. at 237-38. Because New
York had no law entitling prisoners to due process before transfer, the Supreme Court
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significantly and generated weighty criticism, particularly because it signi-
fied a return to unfettered discretion for prison officials. 91 Meachum
marked the genesis of the Court's strict reliance on state statutes in deter-
mining whether a liberty interest existed. 2 Meachum illustrated further a
significant retreat from earlier due process milestones which Wolff and its
predecessors had established.93
D. Mechanical Reliance on Statutory Language: The Methodology of
Greenholtz and Hewitt
The Supreme Court continued to develop its restrictive liberty princi-
ples in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex.94 Respondents relied upon two theories to support their claim
that parole determination is a constitutionally protected interest.95 Rely-
ing on Morrissey v. Brewer,96 in support of their first theory, several in-
mates alleged a constitutionally protected "conditional" liberty interest in
parole grants.97 The inmates claimed specifically that they were denied
could not find a liberty interest. See id. at 243. On remand, the Second Circuit found that,
even if Haymes was not entitled to due process, he had established a colorable claim that
he was transferred for circulating a petition for the redress of grievances-an activity pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188, 191
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
91. Joseph P. Messina, Comment, Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson:
The Demise of Protected Liberty Interests Under the Due Process Clause, 17 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233, 244-45 (1991). In his Meachum dissent, Justice Ste-
vens asserted that if a prisoner's liberty is "no greater than the State chooses to allow, he is
really little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases." Meachum, 427 U.S.
at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens equated the majority's holding with that of
an historical state decision in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871). Meachum,
427 U.S. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Ruffin deemed the inmate a "slave of the state,"
completely deprived of constitutional rights. Id.; see Sargentich, supra note 86, at 410.
Ruffin declared that "[tihe bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a
society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. . . . They are the
slaves of the state undergoing punishment for heinous crimes committed against the laws
of the land." Id. at n.39; see also Herman, supra note 33, at 512. Herman noted
Meachum's restrictions on prisoners' due process claims in federal court, a result that is
"scarcely accidental." Id.; cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (relying alter-
natively on a liberty interest in prisoner's parole based on an "implicit promise").
92. See Messina, supra note 91, at 245 (discussing Meachum's contribution to the
evolving landscape of prisoners' due process rights).
93. Id.
94. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
95. Id. at 8.
96. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing Mor-
rissey's foundational contribution to the landscape of prisoners' due process decisions).
97. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9.
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parole unconstitutionally despite statutes that provided for both man-
datory and discretionary parole.98
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held that
the Parole Board procedures failed to satisfy the due process require-
ments Morrissey had established.99 On appeal,"° the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the inmate had
a "Morrissey-type, conditional liberty interest"''1 and also recognized a
statutorily created liberty interest.'02 The court of appeals nevertheless
modified the procedures the district court set forth. 0 3 Because the
Eighth Circuit's parole procedures conflicted with other circuit court de-
cisions, the Supreme Court granted certiorari' °4 to resolve the conflict. 0 5
98. Id. at 3-4. According to Nebraska statutes, parole is mandatory when an inmate
has served his maximum term less any earned good-time credits. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,
107(1)(b) (1994). Inmates become eligible for discretionary parole when the minimum
term, less earned good-time credits, has been served. Id. § 83-1,110(1). Discretionary pa-
role proceedings begin with an initial review and follow established criteria for granting or
rejecting parole. See id. § 83-192(f)(v) (detailing factors that make up the review, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the inmate's offense, his or her history and criminal record, conduct,
attitude, and employment during incarceration). After reviewing the inmate's entire rec-
ord and determining that the inmate is not a "good risk" for parole, the Board may deny
parole. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 4. The Board must inform the inmate of the reasons
for this decision and suggest recommendations to correct these deficiencies. Id. at 4-5. If
the initial review determines that the inmate is a likely candidate for parole, a final hearing
is scheduled which provides notice, an opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, and
obtain private counsel. Id. at 5. The inmate may not hear adverse testimony, nor cross-
examine witnesses who provide such testimony. Id. If parole is denied, the Board must
furnish the inmate with a written statement of the reasons for the denial. Id.
99. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correction Complex v. Greenholtz, 436 F. Supp. 432,
437-38 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd, 576 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
100. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correction Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274
(8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
101. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5-6.
102. Id. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,114 (1976)).
103. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d at 1285. Modified procedures included: (1) a full, formal
hearing; (2) written notice of the hearing setting forth the factors that the Board will con-
sider for the decision; (3) the inmate's ability to present documentary evidence; (4) a rec-
ord of the proceedings; and (5) a timely and full written explanation as to the facts relied
upon to deny parole. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not allow an inmate the right to call
witnesses except in unusual circumstances because of security considerations. Id.
104. 439 U.S. 817 (1978) (granting certiorari).
105. For an illustration of varying procedures governing parole determinations, see
Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir.) (explaining that the mere expectation of
parole does not rise to the level of grievous loss for procedural protections should parole
be denied), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477
F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (noting how specific standards for procedural due pro-
cess depend on a complexity of factors and standards), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809
(1973); see also Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 788 (4th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that a
state must provide minimum due process protections if it created a statutory liberty inter-
est), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d
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In an analysis reminiscent of Meachum, the Greenholtz Court began
with the premise that "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence."' 6 Although the similar issues of parole revocation in
Morrissey and the initial parole grant in Greenholtz appeared to justify
the same constitutional protections, the Court distinguished them." 7
The Greenholtz Court explained that the decision to grant parole or
release, by its statutory nature, required an in-depth analysis of the facts
coupled with the Board members subjective, sensitive appraisals. 10 8 Ac-
cordingly, based on the inmates' argument that the state statute conferred
a reasonable entitlement to due process, the Court held that although the
state statute alone created liberty interests, the possibility of parole of-
fered only hope that the prisoner would obtain such benefit.10 9
In their second theory, the respondents' claimed that the language of
the state statute created a legitimate expectation of parole, deserving of
due process protections as provided in Wolff."' The Greenholtz Court
made a distinction between the statute at issue and the Wolff statute that
797, 799 (7th Cir. 1975) (deciding minimum due process must be fulfilled in accordance
with a state created liberty interest), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976).
106. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
107. Id. at 9. The parolees in Morrissey were enjoying aspects of "normal life" through
employment and ongoing family contact, whereas the inmates in Greenholtz were re-
stricted to the confines and rules of prison. Id.
108. Id. at 9-10. The Court decided that the decision to grant parole was "subtle and
depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are
purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the
difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release." Id. Courts
have accepted the differences between the initial grant of parole and parole revocation, as
United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole illustrated. 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (1971)
(distinguishing between maintaining conditional freedom and the mere anticipation of
freedom). See Herman, supra note 33, at 513 (arguing that the interests of a parolee and a
prospective parolee are virtually identical, and distinguishing the loss of liberty as more
grievous for the parolee only because of his disdain for reincarceration).
109. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
110. Respondents relied alternatively on the language of the statute governing parole
releases to establish a liberty interest. Id. They argued that the use of the word "shall,"
coupled with four specific reasons for denying parole, created a presumption that parole
release would be granted unless one of the four conditions was met, thus establishing a
legitimate expectation of release. Id. at 11-12. The four reasons to deny parole within the
Nebraska statute include: (1) whether there is substantial risk that the parolee will violate
parole conditions; (2) the release would depreciate the seriousness of the offense or pro-
mote disrespect for the law; (3) the release would have a substantial, adverse effect on
prison discipline; or (4) continued prison treatment, medical care, or vocational training
will substantially affect the parolee's capacity to become a law-abiding citizen if released at
a later time. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) (1976)); see
Gooding, supra note 4, at 164 n.94 (describing the prisoner's reliance on a Nebraska statu-
tory entitlement).
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governed good-time credits, classifying the former as "predictive" and the
latter as "factual." 11' The Greenholtz Court recognized that federalism
affords the state independent control over many policies, and stated that
procedures created to elicit certain facts, as required in Morrissey and
Wolff, are not necessarily as subjective as parole proceedings. 1 2 In dis-
tinguishing the statute at issue in Greenholtz, through scrutiny of statu-
tory language and labeling it as "factual" or "predictive," the Court
demonstrated its preference for relying on statutory language when eval-
uating liberty expectations. 1 3
The implicit methodology for evaluating due process claims in Green-
holtz became explicit four years later in Hewitt v. Helms. 14 After a riot
in a Pennsylvania state prison, officials moved the respondent prisoner
from his cell in the general prison population to administrative segrega-
tion" 5 pending investigation of his misconduct." 6 Although the Hearing
Committee, and later the Program Review Committee, dropped the mis-
conduct charge against the respondent due to insufficient evidence of
guilt, he remained in restricted housing."17
The prisoner then sued the correctional institution claiming that his
confinement in administrative segregation violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights."' The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the correctional facility's mo-
tion for summary judgment, but the United States Court of Appeals for
111. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
112. See id. at 13-14. The Court emphasized: "this statute has unique structure and
language and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must
be decided on a case-by-case basis." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
113. See Herman, supra note 33, at 516-17 (discussing the Court's abandonment of the
traditional methods for evaluating due process inquiries and subsequent focus on statutory
language).
114. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
115. Id. at 463. Administrative confinement, as the statute defined, could be imposed
when: (1) an inmate poses a threat to prison security; (2) when disciplinary charges are
pending; or (3) when necessary for the prisoner's own safety. Id. at 463 n.1 (citing 37 PA.
CODE § 95.104 (1978)).
116. Id. at 463-64. The actual riot resulted from several inmates' joint attempt to over-
take the prison's control center. Id. at 463. In an extremely violent struggle, inmates at-
tacked guards, injuring two, which resulted in the inmates being handcuffed to pipes. Id.
State police units, local officers, and off-duty prison guards were called in to assist the
prison officials. Id.
117. Id. at 464. The Program Review Committee concluded that Helms should remain
in administrative segregation because he was viewed as "a danger to staff and to other
inmates if released back into [the] general [prison] population," and "he was to be ar-
raigned the following day on state criminal charges" and the Committee was still awaiting
information detailing Helms's role in the riot. Id. at 465.
118. Id. at 462.
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the Third Circuit reversed.'19 The Third Circuit held that the respondent
had a protected liberty interest in remaining with the general prison pop-
ulation, which could not be eliminated unless he was provided with ap-
propriate due process.12 0
The Supreme Court reversed,'12 rejecting the respondent's assertion
that the Due Process Clause implicitly created a liberty interest in re-
maining in the general prison population, and stating that the respondent
"[sought] to draw from the Due Process Clause more than it [could]
provide."122
The respondent asserted alternatively that Pennsylvania regulations
created a liberty interest in freedom from "restraints accompanying con-
finement in administrative segregation.' '123 The Court denied firmly that
it had held that statutes and regulations governing prison administration
inherently conferred liberty interests. 124 The Court then concluded that
prisoners do have a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative
119. Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
120. Id. at 503. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether due process
requirements apply to prison officials when removing prisoners from the general prison
population to more restrictive confinement. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 462.
121. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 478. Although the reasons for placing an inmate in administra-
tive confinement differ from those for assigning disciplinary confinement, the conditions
for the two types of confinement were " 'substantially identical.' " Id. at 480 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the majority).
122. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-67. The Court has been consistent in limiting prisoners' to
"the most basic liberty interests." Id. at 467. For example, the Court has held that there is
no constitutional or inherent right to parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal &
Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Additionally, the Court has stated that "the
Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in
prison," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (emphasis added), and that the Due
Process Clause does not protect the transfer of an inmate from one prison to another.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
123. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 469.
124. Id. (stating "we have never held that ... [prison] regulations ... conferred any
liberty interest in and of themselves"). The Hewitt court distinguished this case from ear-
lier cases in which the Court recognized a liberty interest in state-created statutes and
regulations. Id. (distinguishing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving a transfer to
a mental hospital); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 3 (regarding parole expectations); Wolff, 418
U.S. at 539 (concerning good-time credits in parole revocation proceedings)). The Court
concluded that, nonetheless, according to the relevant Pennsylvania regulations, Helms did
acquire a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. Hewitt,
459 U.S. at 470-71; see Thomas L. Finigan, The Procedural Due Process Implications of
Involuntary State Prisoner Transfers: Hewitt v. Helms and Olim v. Wakinekona, 25 B.C. L.
REV. 1087, 1091-92 (1984) (explaining the distinctions between the Court's prior acknowl-
edgments of state-created liberty interests and the Hewitt decision). But see Wright v.
Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), summarily aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). In
Wright, the court, however, did admit that an exception existed, recognizing the necessity
of a meaningful hearing before being classified in a maximum-security facility. Id. at 403-
04.
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segregation, if "the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in con-
nection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclu-
sion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.' '125
The cases since Wolff, particularly Greenholtz and Hewitt, illustrate the
Supreme Court's departure from the examination of the "nature" of the
liberty interest to a stringent focus on mandatory statutory language. 126
Following the Hewitt methodology, the Court became preoccupied with
analyzing the intricate language of regulations and statutes, and less con-
cerned with the nature or deprivation of the liberty interest. 127 This
methodology afforded prisoners an enhanced opportunity to find entitle-
ments in prison regulations and demand due process protections, thereby
threatening states' control over prison regulations and daily
management. 1
28
Hewitt's statutory focus for determining liberty interests has produced
several negative effects. First, Hewitt encouraged prisoners to "comb"
statutory language to find a basis for liberty interests.'29 This, in turn, has
discouraged states from codifying prison management procedures, fur-
ther jeopardizing efforts to curb prison administrators' unfettered discre-
tion. 130 Second, Hewitt led to increased judicial involvement in the daily
management of prisons, thus wasting scarce judicial resources with little
overall benefit. 3 ' Third, adhering strictly to statutory language to find a
125. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472. Having decided the prisoner had a statutorily conferred
liberty interest, the Court then rejected the argument that the full panoply of due process
protections that Wolff set forth were necessary. Id.; see MUSHLIN, supra note 11, § 9.06
(discussing the Court's conclusion in Hewitt that resulted in less procedural safeguards
than Wolff). The Court decided that an informal, nonadversary review of the facts sur-
rounding the administrative segregation, within a reasonable time after the segregation,
was sufficient compliance with due process; anything more would offend prison manage-
ment's objectives. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472. Commentators have criticized the Hewitt ma-
jority's decision that a transfer into solitary confinement is a reasonably foreseeable
occurrence in prison life. Finigan, supra note 124, at 1105. Finigan agreed with Justice
Stevens' dissent that such transfers infringe on a person's "residuum of liberty," thus mak-
ing procedural protections even more necessary. Id, (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 488 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)).
126. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2298-99 (1995) (recognizing this departure).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 2299.
129. Id.
130. Id. States may avoid creating liberty entitlements by refraining from enacting reg-
ulations and statutes; however, this result would sacrifice important goals of ensuring the
safe operation and effective management of prisons. Id.
131. Id. Hewitt marks a distinct departure from accepted notions, as stated in Wolff,
that courts must "afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to
manage a volatile [prison] environment." Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
561-63 (1974)); see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,
135-36 (1977) (finding that prison regulations prohibiting inmates from engaging in activi-
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liberty interest, rather than examining the nature of the deprivation, cre-
ates a negative jurisprudence. 132 This negative jurisprudence means that
courts have inferred from mandatory statutory language that a finding of
guilt "shall" be imposed if they find that certain conditions exist.' 33 In
the absence of those statutory predicates, courts will not find guilt, even
where a subjective examination, independent of the statutory language,
properly would dictate such a guilty finding.' 3 4
For these reasons, prisoners' due process cases since Wolff have re-
sulted in a narrow view of protected liberty interests. 135 More impor-
tantly, the Court's emphasis on state statutory language in evaluating
liberty interest claims undermines and denies prisoners Fourteenth
Amendment protection.136  Examining statutory language, rather than
ties that promoted a labor union, while permitting activities of other organizations, were
permissible because they fell within the authority of prison officials to determine the condi-
tions of confinement).
132. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
133. Id. The Sandin majority did not determine that courts should never draw negative
inferences from mandatory statutory language, recognizing its utility in defining "rights
and remedies available to the general public." Id. In interpreting regulations that apply
solely to the prison population, the Court, however, stated that drawing negative infer-
ences clashed with the purpose of prison regulations, which were designed to guide offi-
cials' administrative duties. Id. Thus, by following Hewitt's illustration of negative
jurisprudence, courts recognized prisoners' liberty interests that the regulations never in-
tended to create. Id.
134. Id. The Hewitt Court held that the Due Process Clause alone does not create a
defensible interest in remaining in the general prison population. Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 466-67 (1983). Rather, the Court searched for the right in the statutory language.
Id. at 470-71. Justice Stevens discussed the long-term effects of this decision in his dissent:
[T]he Court seems to assume that after his conviction a prisoner has, in essence,
no liberty save that created, in writing, by the State which imprisons him. Under
this view a prisoner crosses into limbo when he enters into penal confinement.
He might have some minimal freedoms if the State chooses to bestow them; but
such freedom as he has today may be taken away tomorrow.
Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. Murphy, Comment, Liberty Within
Prison Walls as a Natural Right? Hewitt v. Helms, 11 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 217, 233 (1985) (quoting Justice Stevens). Murphy notes that dangers exist
when states determine the extent to which the Constitution protects a certain liberty. Id. at
235. Motivated by financial constraints, many state legislatures are wary about creating
new liberty expectations for prisoners to litigate and decline to state procedural guidelines
clearly. Id.
135. See Messina, supra note 91, at 233-34 (discussing trends in Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding prisoners' due process rights).
136. See Murphy, supra note 134, at 235-37. Murphy recognized that, in addition to
undermining the application and purpose of the Constitution, the Court in Hewitt failed to
determine and articulate exactly what rights are protected. Id. at 236. Without a bright-
line test, or at least articulable examples, courts will return to granting prison officials'
decisions substantial deference. See infra notes 201-06 (illustrating Justice Ginsburg's dis-
sent in Sandin, focusing upon the consequences of allocating Due Process inquiries to the
states); see also Call, supra note 9, at 45 (offering a pre-Sandin prediction of future 5-4
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the underlying liberty interest, does little to reduce the constant litigation
of prisoners' rights and encourages courts to review these cases on an ad
hoc basis.1
37
II. SANDIN v. CONNER: A BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR PRISONERS'
LIBERTY INTERESTS CLAIMS
A. Disciplinary Proceedings: The Backdrop for Conner's
Due Process Claim
In Sandin v. Conner,38 the Supreme Court redefined the landscape of
prisoners' due process law and dictated a new standard for reviewing such
claims. DeMont Conner, an inmate in a Hawaii state prison, was under-
going a required strip search before attending a religious ceremony, when
he became hostile and obstructed the guard's search. 139 Charged with
"high misconduct," Conner appeared before a prison adjustment commit-
tee and requested the opportunity to present witnesses that he contended
could establish his innocence. 140
Citing only administrative, not safety, concerns, the adjustment com-
mittee denied Conner's request to call witnesses and found him guilty of
the misconduct charges.' 41 The committee sentenced him to thirty days
in disciplinary confinement in a "Special Holding Unit.' 42 Initially, Con-
ner sought administrative review of the decision, but before the appeal
was decided, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Hawaii pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he had been
deprived, of his procedural due process rights in disciplinary proceed-
prisoners' rights decisions, favoring prisons, and thus threatening a return to the "defer-
ence period" of unfettered prison discretion).
137. Murphy, supra note 134, at 236-37. Murphy contends that the Supreme Court
must adopt a more effective approach to communicate the rights of prisoners to the states
so that state administrators may better safeguard those rights. Id.
138. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
139. Respondent's Brief at 3, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
Conner was serving an indeterminate sentence for 30 years to life in the Halawa Correc-
tional Facility in Oahu, Hawaii, for numerous state crimes including murder, kidnapping,
robbery, and burglary. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295.
140. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. The notice of "high misconduct" alleged that Conner
used "physical interference to impair a correctional function." Id. Additionally, Conner
was charged with "low moderate misconduct for using abusive or obscene language and for
harassing employees." Id.; see supra note 30 (providing the language of the Hawaii Ad-
ministrative Rule detailing misconduct charge criteria).
141. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296 (noting that the adjustment committee refused Con-
ner's request to present witnesses because they were short staffed).
142. Id. The terms "disciplinary confinement" and "solitary confinement" are used in-
terchangeably throughout the opinion and many other articles and secondary sources on
prison confinement. The majority suggested that Conner's disciplinary confinement mir-
rored other kinds of administrative segregation and protective custody. Id. at 2301.
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ings.143 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
prison officials.' 44 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed with respect to the disciplinary segregation issue, 45 deter-
mining that Conner had a liberty interest in remaining free from
disciplinary segregation. 146 The court found that whether Conner had re-
ceived all the process Wolff required was a disputed issue of fact.1 47 Fol-
lowing previous cases, the Ninth Circuit based its establishment of
Conner's liberty interest on a Hawaii prison regulation that instructed the
committee to find guilt when substantial evidence supported a charge of
misconduct.'14  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the
circumstances under which prisoners may rely on state prison regulations
to establish liberty interests that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects.149
B. The Majority Opinion: A Return to the Past Dictates the Future of
Prisoners' Due Process Claims
In Sandin, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
neither the Due Process Clause nor the Hawaii prison regulation created
a liberty interest that implicated the procedural protections Wolff set
forth. 5 ° Writing for the five-member majority,' 5 ' Chief Justice Rehn-
quist criticized the Ninth Circuit's methodology and rejected the standard
for evaluating due process claims that the Court had developed in the
preceding twenty years. 152 In repudiating its prior approach, which fo-
cused upon the statutorily-created liberty interest, the Court reinstated
the methodology of Wolff, and attempted to calm the growing concerns
143. Id. at 2296. Nine months after Conner's appeal for administrative review of the
hearing, the deputy administrator determined that the high misconduct charge was unsup-
ported and he expunged that charge from Conner's record. Id.
144. Id.
145. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
146. Id. at 1466. The court based its determination on Hawaii's regulations, which
"provide[d] explicit standards that fetter official discretion." Id.
147. Id. at 1467. The court found that while Conner was given advance notice of his
hearing, a material fact existed as to whether' he was permitted to call witnesses. Id. at
1467-68.
148. Id. at 1466 (citing Hewitt and Thompson).
149. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2297.
150. Id. at 2302.
151. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id. at 2295. Justice Ginsburg dissented,
and Justice Stevens joined. Id. Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Souter joined. Id.
152. Id. at 2299-2302. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[tlhe time ha[d] come to
return to the due process principles ... correctly established and applied in Wolff and
Meachum." Id. at 2300.
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over maintaining the integrity of prison administration and judicial
efficiency. 15
3
1. Reaffirming Wolff: A Return to Mutual Accommodation
The Sandin majority began its due process inquiry with a discussion of
Wolff.154 The majority recognized that in Wolff,'5 5 a state statute man-
dated reduced sentences for good behavior.5 6 Absent this statute, how-
ever, inmates had no valid claim to a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause.' 57 The Wolff Court had considered an inmate's interest
in a "shortened prison sentence" one of "real substance."' 5 8 As a result,
Wolff established minimum procedural safeguards to reach a " 'mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provi-
sions of the Constitution.' "'9 Justice Rehnquist explained in Sandin
that Wolff s balancing test contributed substantially to prisoners' due pro-
cess jurisprudence. 60 Following Wolff, the Supreme Court began to ex-
pand permissible prisoners' liberty interest claims, but in Meachum, the
Court attempted to restrict the application of procedural due process.'
6 1
The Sandin majority recognized that the dictum in Meachum, which dis-
tinguished the Court's focus in Wolff, marked the beginning of the
Court's emphasis on statutory language as the analytical basis for creating
liberty rights which eventually became the foundation in Hewitt v.
Helms.16
2
2. Abandoning the Hewitt Methodology
Tracing case law from Wolff to Hewitt, 6 3 the Sandin majority criticized
Hewitt's focus on a strict examination of mandatory statutory language as
the basis for determining liberty interests and cited its undesirable re-
153. Id. at 2300-02. The Court remained concerned with those instances where prison
officials imposed "atypical" or "significant" hardship on prisoners. Id. at 2300.
154. Id. at 2297.
155. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing the factual background
and holding of Wolff).
156. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2297.
157. Id. (stating that the "Due Process Clause itself does not create a liberty interest").
158. Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974)).
159. Id. (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556).
160. Id. at 2297. Sandin explained Wolff s test as balancing "prison management con-
cerns with prisoners' liberty" to determine the amount of process due. Id.
161. See id.; Sargentich, supra note 86, at 406 (discussing the extension of procedural
safeguards in Wolff, followed by restrictions imposed in Meachum).
162. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298 (discussing Meachum, Greenholtz, and. Hewitt).
163. See discussion, supra part I (examining relevant case law that contributed to the
landscape of prisoners due process claims).
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suits. 164 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, as the Court shifted its
inquiry from the nature of the deprivation to the language of the regula-
tion, it was encouraging prisoners to "comb" regulations for liberty inter-
ests on which they could base entitlements. 165  Moreover, courts
responded to this shift by drawing "negative inferences" from mandatory
language in the prison regulations. 166 The Sandin majority disagreed
with this approach, but qualified its criticism by stating that this inference
was "not altogether illogical[ ]," given the Hewitt standard. 67
3. Prison Power: The Return of Judicial Deference
In supporting a departure from its approach in Hewitt, the Sandin ma-
jority emphasized two undesirable results that such an approach had
caused. 6 8 First, the majority claimed that Hewitt provided disincentives
for states to codify prison management procedures because of fear of friv-
olous constitutional claims.1 69 The majority determined that states and
prisoners possess a significant interest in having uniform treatment within
the prison system, and that Hewitt threatened this goal substantially."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Hewitt approach signified a
return to the "standardless discretion" that plagued prisons prior to
courts' recognition of prisoners' due process rights.1 7 '
Second, the majority observed that the Hewitt approach involved fed-
eral courts needlessly in the "day-to-day management" of prisons, while
simultaneously "squandering" scarce judicial resources without signifi-
cant benefit.' 7 2 Despite the rationale behind the Court's initial involve-
ment in prisoners' due process issues, the majority criticized federal court
164. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298-99. Interestingly, Rehnquist wrote Hewitt's majority
opinion, the same methodology which he criticized in Sandin. Hewitt, 459 U.S. 461; see
supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing the negative effects of Hewitt
methodology).
165. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
166. Id. The Court of Appeals' negative inference was that because the statute man-
dated a finding of guilt when certain conditions existed, absent those conditions, no finding
of guilt was possible. See id.; see supra note 133 (describing the Court's opinion of the
utility of negative jurisprudence within a prison regulation context).
167. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. Such guidelines protect the prisoner from the random imposition of official
discretion. Id. In addition, guidelines benefit the subordinate employees as well; by pro-
viding boundaries that curb the discretion of staff, the authoritarian structure of the prison
allows for a safer environment. Id.
171. See id. (stating that this "standardless discretion" would allow states to avoid the
creation of liberty interests).
172. Id
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involvement in prison administrative issues and re-embraced the notion
of deference to state officials in prison management.173
These negative effects led the majority to reject the search for
mandatory language in prison regulations to find liberty interests and to
embrace the previous standard that Wolff and Meachum established.174
According to the majority, Wolff s approach, which focused upon liberty
interests that imposed "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," would better serve the
interests of prison management and the allocation of judicial resources.' 75
4. Solitary Confinement: A "Typical and Insignificant" Deprivation
Applying the Wolff approach, focusing on the prisoner's deprivation,
the majority decided that Conner was not entitled to a protectable Due
Process Clause liberty interest. 176 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the na-
ture of the deprivations in Vitek v. Jones177 and Washington v. Harper 78
as examples of circumstances where an inmate confronts "atypical and
significant hardship.' 79 Because Conner's solitary confinement did not
differ significantly from administrative segregation, the majority asserted
that his situation did not trigger the due process protections developed in
Wolff. 8° Despite Conner's reference to dicta in other cases, which sug-
gested that solitary confinement is a significant deprivation, the majority
173. Id. at 2299-2300; see infra note 221 (illustrating examples of "trivial" administra-
tive situations that prison administration officials better serve, rather than federal courts).
174. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
175. Id. These hardships are to be distinguished from those instances where the pris-
oner's sentence is exceeded in such an unexpected manner that the Due Process Clause
would apply on its own. See id.
176. Id. at 2301; see supra note 88 (discussing liberty interests inherent in the Due Pro-
cess Clause).
177. 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (establishing a prisoner's liberty interest in being free
from a transfer to a mental hospital against his will).
178. 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (concluding that a prisoner possessed a liberty interest in
being free from the administration of psychotropic drugs against his will).
179. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300. Additionally, the majority rejected Conner's assertion
that any state action taken for punitive measures violates liberty interests even absent state
regulations. Id. at 2300-01. The majority declined to recognize Conner's reliance on both
Bell v. Wolfish and Ingraham v. Wright, because each case could easily be distinguished.
Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979) (addressing the interests of pretrial
detainees, not convicted prisoners); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977) (dealing
with arbitrary corporal punishment of school children, not convicted felons).
180. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301-02. Although Conner was placed in "disciplinary segre-
gation," the Court maintained that such condition paralled "administrative segregation."
Id. at 2301; see supra note 27 (explaining the similarities between administrative and
disciplinary segregation). But see supra note 142 (discussing the majority's observation
that Conner's disciplinary environment mirrored both administrative segregation and pro-
tective custody).
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failed to classify Conner's segregation as an "atypical and significant
hardship."'' Furthermore, because officials expunged Conner's record
after he served time in solitary confinement, the majority held that the
adjustment committee did not affect the prisoner's prospect for parole. 182
The Sandin majority concluded that Conner did not possess a valid lib-
erty interest either under the Due Process Clause itself or through a stat-
utory entitlement. 183 The majority viewed Conner's punishment as
"within the range of confinement to be normally expected.' 1 84 Concur-
rently, the majority abandoned the Hewitt methodology, returned to the
approach that Wolff and Meachum developed, and thereby guided Due
Process Clause analysis back to the nature of the deprivation.
C. The Dissents
Justice Ginsburg, who Justice Stevens joined, began the analysis of her
dissent with the historical foundation of due process: the Constitution it-
self.'85 Justice Breyer, presenting an additional dissent that Justice Sou-
ter joined, disagreed with the majority's failure to classify solitary
confinement as an "atypical and significant hardship.' s6 Additionally,
Justice Breyer argued that a liberty interest could depend on state stat-
utes for its creation. 8 7
1. Justice Ginsburg: Embracing Traditions of Liberty and Due
Process
Justice Ginsburg began her argument by disagreeing clearly with the
established method of looking for mandatory language to determine lib-
181. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301; see supra note 73 (referencing a footnote in Wolff where
the Court recognized that a prisoner has a liberty interest in remaining free from solitary
confinement).
182. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301-02. Nothing in Hawaii's code requires the parole board
to deny parole because of a misconduct charge, or to grant parole in its absence. Id. at
2302 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 353-68-69 (1985)). But cf id. (citing Haw. Admin. Rule
§ 23-700-33(b) (effective Aug. 1992) (providing that misconduct is a relevant consideration
for parole review boards)); infra note 196 (illustrating Justice Ginsburg's argument that
"disciplinary confinement ... cannot be bracketed with administrative and protective cus-
tody"); infra note 209 (criticizing the prison official's attempt to make a disciplinary charge
an administrative one through expungement); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Restrictions on
Prisoners' Liberty Interests, N.Y.L.J., August 15, 1995, at 31 (finding the majority's reason-
ing that expungement could affect a liberty interest determination troubling).
183. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302. Because Conner did not have a liberty interest, he was
not entitled to Wolffs procedural protections. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2302-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the Due Process Clause as the
"wellspring" of the protection Conner merited).
186. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2305-07.
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erty interest inquiries.188 She asserted that recent trends in prisoner due
process analysis, stemming from Hewitt, had proven to "yield... practical
anomal[ies]" and undesirable results. 189 Current due process precedent,
as applied to prisoners seeking to address liberty interests, focused upon
parsing statutory language and abandoned the traditional analysis of the
nature of the deprivation.190 Although the Supreme Court had shown
reluctance to rely upon the Due Process Clause itself to recognize liberty
interests, 191 Justice Ginsburg purposefully ignored the statutory focus and
looked directly to the Due Process Clause for guidance. 92
a. Fundamental Protections of the Due Process Clause "Itself"
Justice Ginsburg advocated a return to the pre-Hewitt approach of
Wolff and Meachum, which considered the nature of the deprivation af-
fecting the prisoner.' 93 At first, Justice Ginsburg seemingly agreed with
the majority's abandonment of statutorily created liberty interests as the
appropriate foundation for due process analysis. 94 However, she dis-
agreed with the majority's result, which failed to recognize Conner's dep-
rivation as deserving of due process protections. 195 In Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, by depriving Conner of privileges for extended periods, stigma-
tizing his conduct record and prison reputation, and diminishing parole
prospects, Conner's disciplinary segregation constituted a "severe altera-
188. Id. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that "[d]eriving protected liberty in-
terests from mandatory language... would make.., fundamental right[s] something more
in certain states, something less in others").
189. Id. Justice Ginsburg explained the anomaly to be:
a State that scarcely attempts to control the behavior of its prison guards may, for
that very laxity, escape constitutional accountability; a State that tightly cabins the
discretion of its prison workers may, for that attentiveness, become vulnerable to
constitutional claims. An incentive for ruleless prison management disserves the
State's penological goals and jeopardizes the welfare of prisoners.
Id.
190. See id. at 2302-03; supra notes 129-37 (discussing the practical, negative effects on
prisoners' and prison administration that have resulted from the due process methodology
outlined in Hewitt).
191. Many prisoners have argued that the Due Process Clause itself confers liberty in-
terests in certain situations, but the Supreme Court has accepted this reasoning rarely,
limiting such situations to those outlined in Vitek and Washington. See supra note 88 (dis-
cussing the unique facts of both cases where the Due Process Clause itself was found to
confer a liberty interest irrespective of state regulation).
192. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Constitu-
tional protections should not depend on local law).
193. Id. at 2302-03.
194. Id. at 2303. ,
195. Id. at 2302-03; see also Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer stated that "the majority's reasoning ... particularly when read in light of this
Court's precedents, seems to me to lead to the opposite conclusion." Id.
19961
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tion in the conditions of his incarceration." '196 Additionally, Conner had
to spend the entire time isolated in his cell, separated from routine in-
mate contact, with a reprieve of only fifty minutes each day for a shower
and exercise and even then leg and waist chains constrained him.19 7
Following Wolff and Meachum, Justice Ginsburg argued that Conner's
reduction of privileges, his threatened parole prospects, and the overall
stigma of disciplinary confinement should qualify such confinement as a
liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process protection. 98 Thus, she
disagreed with the majority's benign characterization of Conner's segre-
gation, and recognized that solitary confinement was indeed the sort of
serious deprivation that the Due Process Clause itself sought to pro-
tect.' 99 Recognizing only the Due Process Clause and not state action for
the source of liberty interests, Ginsburg rejected the methodology that
required courts to examine mandatory statutory codes for liberty inter-
ests, stating that this "would make of the fundamental right something
more in certain States, something less in others."2 '
b. Statutory Focus: An Unnecessary Phase in Due Process
Analysis?
To support her analysis, Justice Ginsburg illustrated the anomalous re-
sults that the Hewitt approach produced.210' Following Hewitt's reason-
ing, a state seeking to avoid constitutional accountability could construct
a vague statute, assuring prisoners difficulty in defining liberty inter-
ests. 20 2 Conversely, a state that defined a statute narrowly to "cabin[ ]
196. Id. Although the state of Hawaii expunged Conner's record after his successful
administrative appeal, Justice Ginsburg noted that "hindsight cannot tell us whether a lib-
erty interest existed at the outset. One must, of course, know at the start the character of
the interest at stake in order to determine then what process, if any, is constitutionally due.
'All's well that ends well' cannot be the measure here." Id. at 2303 n.1.
197. Id. at 2305 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19
(1974). In a significant footnote in Wolff, the Court compared the necessary procedural
safeguards for deprivation of good-time credits to disciplinary confinement, specifically,
solitary confinement. Id. The Court went on to state: "[solitary confinement] represents a
major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is
claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct." Id.
198. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 2303 & n.2 (noting that the majority provided no examples of what
would constitute an "atypical, significant deprivation," but nevertheless fail to "trigger pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause itself").
200. Id. at 2303. Justice Ginsburg borrowed language from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence when she stated: "Liberty that may vary from Ossining, New York, to San Quentin,
California, does not resemble the 'Liberty' enshrined among 'unalienable Rights' with
which all persons are 'endowed by their Creator.' " Id.
201. Id.; see supra note 189 and accompanying text (quoting this anomaly).
202. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2203 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the discretion of its prison workers" would become more susceptible to
constitutional claims.20 3 Thus, Justice Ginsburg's opinion reflected the
same concerns that the majority cited: results that impede fair and effec-
tive prison management and jeopardize the welfare of the prisoners.20 4
She recognized that liberty interests cannot function as a fundamental
part of the federal government if local prison codes treat them inconsis-
tently.20 5 As a solution, Justice Ginsburg asserted that Conner's liberty
interest in remaining free from solitary confinement was one that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected directly.20
6
2. Challenging the Majority: Advocating Notions of Stare Decisis
Justice Breyer, with Justice Souter joining him, dissented on the basis
that regardless of whether state law gives prison officials broad discre-
tionary power to impose changes in a prisoner's confinement, the discipli-
nary confinement at issue deprived Conner of a constitutionally protected
207 ti
"liberty" interest. ° In this respect, Justice Breyer disagreed with the
majority's ultimate conclusion that on the facts of this case Conner's pun-
ishment was not a significant deprivation of a "liberty" interest.20 8 Justice
Breyer reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that Conner's
disciplinary record was expunged, reasoning that a later expungement
could not "restore" a lost liberty.20 9 Thus, according to Justice Breyer,
Conner was deprived of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause and he was entitled to an additional disciplinary hearing if, on
remand, there was a factual dispute.21u
203. Id.
204. Id.; supra notes 165-75 (illustrating the majority's similar concerns with the nega-
tive effects that Hewitt methodology produced). For a prisoners' rights advocate's perspec-
tive on Hewitt and its applicability to due process claims involving disciplinary charges, see
JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 263
(3d ed. 1995). Boston and Manville view Hewitt-type analysis suitable for "subjective" and
"intuitive" judgments involving administrative segregation, but assert that Wolff "trial-
type" safeguards are necessary for disciplinary proceedings. Id.
205. Sandin, '115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2304. Having determined that the prison officials deprived Conner of a lib-
erty interest pursuant to the Due Process Clause, Justice Ginsburg recommended that the
case be remanded "for a precisely focused determination whether Conner received the
process that was indeed due." Id.
207. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2309. Justice Breyer questioned the majority's reasoning, stating, "[hiow can
a later decision of prison authorities transform Conner's segregation for a violation of a
specific disciplinary rule into a term of segregation under the administrative rules?" Id.
According to Justice Breyer, despite the prison officials' expungement efforts to remedy
the stigma of Conner's confinement, he nevertheless, "suffered a deprivation that was sig-
nificant, not insignificant." Id.
210. Id. at 2310.
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Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Breyer saw no need to
change, or to clarify pre-existing law's "liberty" defining standards in any
respect.2 ' Instead, Justice Breyer saw only the need to elaborate on, and
explain, the Supreme Court's present standard in order to make clear
that courts do not create procedurally protected "liberty" interests where
only minor matters are at stake.212 Justice Breyer asserted that the scope
of prisoner deprivations may be categorized as (1) the significant, (2) the
broad middle category, and (3) the insignificant. 213 Although significant
deprivations clearly demand due process protections, and the insignifi-
cant deprivations do not, it was the difficulty of classifying the "broad
middle category" of deprivations that prompted the majority to reformu-
late due process analysis.214 Justice Breyer contended that a "radical re-
vision" of existing law was not necessary to achieve the majority's
objective of protecting only the significant prisoner deprivations. 215 Ac-
cording to Justice Breyer, prisoners' due process analysis was already in
place and in need simply of explanation. 216
a. Significant Deprivations of Liberty: Triggering Due Process
Protections
Justice Breyer recognized that some changes in the conditions of a pris-
oner's confinement may be so severe as to trigger due process protec-
tions, irrespective of state statutes granting prison administrators the
authority to impose them.21 7 In such cases, the Court has held that state
authorities may not impose changes in conditions of confinement "with-
211. Id. at 2306.
212. Id. Justice Breyer argued that the majority's decision "threatens the law with un-
certainty, for some lower courts may read the majority opinion as offering significantly less
protection against deprivation of liberty, while others may find in it an extension of protec-
tion to certain "atypical" hardships that preexisting law would not have covered." Id. For
criticism of Justice Breyer's opinion that some lower courts might actually afford more
protection to prisoners given the Sandin decision, see Schwartz, supra note 182, at 31 (stat-
ing that "this is nothing more than wishful thinking of a dissenting Justice.... It is simply
unrealistic to think that the conservative majority intended to promote the procedural due
process rights of prisoners in any respect"). But see Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 n.5. Here,
the majority stated that its opinion, which abandoned the Hewitt methodology, "[did] not
technically require us to overrule any holding of this Court .... Our decision today only
abandons an approach that in practice is difficult to administer and which produces anoma-
lous results." Id.
213. See id. at 2306-08; infra notes 217-46 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Breyer's three categories of prisoner deprivations, and his argument that existing prece-
dent addresses all three).
214. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2306.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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out complying with minimum requirements of due process. 2 18 Applying
this general pre-existing principle to the facts of Sandin, Justice Breyer
concluded that the majority should have determined that Conner's disci-
plinary confinement deprived him of a "constitutionally protected
'liberty.' "219
b. The Insignificancies of Prison Life: Outside the Scope of Due
Process Clause Protection
Justice Breyer stated that just as some deprivations are so severe as to
trigger automatically due process protections, other deprivations are so
insignificant that they clearly do not fall within the scope of Due Process
Clause analysis.22° Justice Breyer recognized that these trivial depriva-
tions, which are often similar to the prisoners' original conditions of con-
finement, should be identified easily as minor deprivations.221 Although
separating the "unimportant" from the "potentially significant" without
the help of the "more objective 'discretion-cabining' test" would become
the courts' burden, Justice Breyer argued that this task is well within the
courts' capacity.222 By applying judicial common sense, Justice Breyer
218. Id. at 2304-05. Like the majority, Justice Breyer recognized the Court's classifica-
tion of Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990),
as examples of severe changes in the conditions of a prisoner's confinement warranting due
process protection. See id. at 2300; supra note 88 (discussing the facts of Vitek and
Washington).
219. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As opposed to eight hours of
commingling with other prisoners, Conner was allowed out of his cell only 50 minutes per
day, for a shower and brief exercise. Id. at 2305. During this brief reprieve from his cell,
Conner was constrained by leg irons and waist chains and isolated from other prisoners.
Id. Justice Breyer recognized that this punishment demonstrated a "fairly major change"
in the conditions of his confinement." Id.
220. Id. at 2308.
221. Id. One example of "trivial" rights the majority cited occurred in the case of Bur-
gin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990), in which an inmate claimed a liberty interest in
receiving a hot "tray lunch" rather than a "sack lunch." Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300. The
majority cited additional common prisoner complaints raised as "liberty interests" and dis-
couraged the involvement of federal courts in these insignificant matters. Id. at 2299-2300
(citing Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (claiming a liberty interest in the right
to participate in prison "boot camp" type program); Segal v. Biller, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
30628, at *1 (9th Cir. 1994) (claiming a liberty interest in a waiver of the travel limit placed
on prison furloughs); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 506-08 (6th Cir. 1985) (claiming a
liberty interest in receiving a paperback dictionary), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986);
Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 767-69 (8th Cir.) (claiming a liberty interest in not being
transferred to a smaller cell that lacked adequate outlets for television and a liberty inter-
est in prison employment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984).
222. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
576 (1975) (discussing an attempt to establish a "de minimus" or insignificant line concept
for defining property interests under the Due Process Clause; those falling below this
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argued that significant matters, such as solitary confinement, are readily
distinguishable from unimportant matters.223
Justice Breyer commented that the majority interpreted the "discre-
tion-cabining" test as providing procedural protections for trivial rights,
thus needlessly involving the courts in daily prison management.224 How-
ever, Justice Breyer argued that this test, though useful in interpreting the
"broad middle category" of prisoners' deprivations, is not necessary for
determining insignificant deprivations.225 Justice Breyer recognized that
the Court's precedent has never held that comparatively unimportant
deprivations fall within the scope of the Due Process Clause, regardless
of whether state law limits the prison officials' authority to impose
them. 226 Justice Breyer asserted that the majority did not need to create
a new standard to limit insignificant prisoner deprivations from federal
court inquiry, stating that this limit is "already implicit in the Court's
precedent. "227
c. Where Do We Draw the Line?: The Utility of Statute Scrutiny
in Defining the "Broad Middle Category" of Deprivations
Justice Breyer noted that the Court has recognized deprivations,
although less severe and closer to the original terms of confinement, that
may deserve procedural protections, provided that state law "narrowly
cabins the legal power of authorities to impose the deprivation., 228 Re-
gardless of the existence of state-created liberty interests, Justice Breyer
recognized difficulties in determining "when, or how much of, a loss trig-
gers this protection., 229 He identified a "broad middle category" of dep-
"line" would be too insignificant to necessitate federal judicial scrutiny which would pro-
vide more certainty to due process inquiries).
223. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Id. Justice Breyer argued that when a restraint fell clearly outside of the middle
category as so unimportant to not warrant protection, the "discretion-cabining" approach
was inapplicable. Id. at 2307.
226. Id. at 2308.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2304; see, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
461 (1989). Thompson illustrated the two sources from which liberty interests may arise:
the Due Process Clause and state law creating enforceable rights. Id. at 460-61. Aside
from the holdings in Vitek and Washington, the Court has been unwilling to grant liberty
interests in the absence of state law conferring such rights. See, e.g., id. at 461 (stating that
the Court's method of inquiry always has been to examine closely the language of the
statutes and regulations); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1983) (state regula-
tions regarding interstate prison transfers governed existence of liberty interests); Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983). (liberty interest created by regulations requires that
substantive predicates be observed before imposing administrative segregation).
229. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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rivations that are "neither obviously so serious as to fall within, nor
obviously so insignificant as to fall without the [Due Process] Clause's
protection. ' 231 Unlike Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer recognized a
value in preserving a standard that examines statutory language. 31 In
particular, he cited the "cabining of discretion" standard, explicit in local
statutes and regulations, as the key to interpreting the "broad middle cat-
egory" of deprivations. 232
Justice Breyer noted that the "difficult line-drawing task" within this
middle category had motivated the Court to develop previously its addi-
tional liberty-defining standard in Thompson and Hewitt.233 By examin-
ing state law provisions, the Court may determine the gravity of the
liberty deprivation simply by the degree that the statute controls prison
officials' unfettered discretion.234
Directing his analysis to the applicable Hawaii rules, Justice Breyer
noted that the rules do "severely cabin the authority of prison officials to
impose this kind of punishment. 2 35 The prison rules thus: (1) imposed
substantial punishment; (2) restricted such punishment to the commission
of a defined offense; and (3) established nondiscretionary standards for
deciding if the inmate committed the offense.2 36 Having chosen such
"liberty-defining" standards to constitute the rule, officials could not as-
sign punishment absent "specified substantive predicates. '2 37 Following
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2306-07.
232. Id.
233. Id.; see, e.g., Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
234. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2305. Various sections of the Hawaii Administrative Rules limit prison offi-
cials' discretion:
(a) that certain specified acts shall constitute "high misconduct,"
Haw.Admin.Rule § 17-201-7a; (b) that misconduct punishable by more than four
hours in disciplinary segregation "shall be punished" through a prison "adjust-
ment committee" (composed of three unbiased members), §§ 17-201-12, 13; (c)
that, when an inmate is charged with such misconduct, then (after notice and a
hearing) "[a] finding of guilt shall be made" if the charged inmate admits guilt or
the "charge is supported by substantial evidence," §§ 17-201-18(b), (b)(2); see
88 17-201-16, 17 [requirements for notice and hearing]; and (d) that the
"[s]anctions" for high misconduct that "may be imposed as punishment ... shall
include ... [d]isciplinary segregation up to thirty days," § 17-201-7(b).
Id.
236. Id. at 2305-06.
237. Id. at 2306 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)). The concept of
substantive predicates may be illustrated more simply by example: if the state has chosen
to define a particular disciplinary regulation as "solitary confinement will be ordered if X is
found," the state has created an inmate's liberty interest in not being deprived of freedom
from solitary confinement unless X is found. Once a liberty interest is created, X cannot
be "found" without constitutionally adequate due process.
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this existing methodology, Justice Breyer noted that the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recognized a state created liberty interest; therefore,
the only question for analysis on remand would simply be what process
was due.238
According to Justice Breyer, several important reasons support state
law as a proper basis for determining liberty interests in a prison con-
text.239 In one instance, he considered the state legislature or administra-
tive agency's fitness to enact statutes or regulations to protect liberty
interests, and the prison administrator's ability to comply, without the
court "second-guess[ing]" its decisions. 24° Justice Breyer stated that such
matters did not require the court's sophisticated, judgmental discretion,
and were properly governed by the appropriate state provision.241 Fur-
ther, Justice Breyer argued that courts are well-equipped to determine
whether state statutes or regulations sufficiently "cabin" the prison offi-
cials' discretion, thus courts may use this approach as a helpful "touch-
stone" for determining the "broad middle category" of deprivations,
without significantly altering existing law.242
Justice Breyer recognized that the majority reaffirmed that the Due
Process Clause protects state created liberty interests. 243 However, in
light of this reaffirmation, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority
should have affirmed, rather than reversed, the Ninth Circuit.2 " To alle-
viate the majority's fear that application of the Due Process Clause to
"significant" deprivations would frustrate prison administration, Justice
Breyer pointed out that the process which is due is not the "full blown
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2307. Justice Breyer's reasons for focusing on state law include: (1) that a
further deprivation of an inmate's freedom, governed by local law, is more apt to have
"played an important role in the life of the inmate"; (2) that the state has historically
provided procedural protection for that type of matter that have normally proven useful in
making determinations; (3) that the matter will probably not require sensitive, judgmental
discretion, that would require the courts challenging prison administrators discretion; and
(4) that the inmate himself could have avoided the deprivation by avoiding misbehavior,
and believed that the restraint exceeded his imposed sentence. Id.
240. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2307; see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (assert-
ing that prison officials are more appropriate than federal courts when it comes to address-
ing a wide spectrum of prison disciplinary actions).
241. Id. For an argument supporting the analysis of state law in prisoners' due process
inquiries, see Prisoners' Rights-Punishments Imposed By Administrative Proceedings, 109
HARV. L. REV. 141, 149 (1995) [hereinafter Prisoners' Rights). The article argues that
Sandin's "prohibition on looking to a regulation's mandatory or discretionary character
undermines a crucial piece of the analysis of state-born interests." Id.
242. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 2308-09.
244. Id. at 2308-09.
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procedure" of a criminal trial.2a 5 Rather, Justice Breyer stressed that due
process was a flexible doctrine designed to provide protections to particu-
lar situations, and in this case, should protect Conner's significant depri-
vation as well.2 46
III. REFORMULATING THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD FOR PRISONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Constitutional Guesswork: Attempting Classification of an "Atypical
and Significant Hardship"
The Sandin majority reduced substantially prisoners' abilities to claim
constitutional liberty interests successfully. By abandoning almost thirty
years of decision-making methodology, the Court sent a clear message to
prisoners: liberty interest suits that do not involve the nebulous classifica-
tion of "atypical and significant hardships" will not prevail.24 7 But in de-
fining the interests that will invoke due process protections, the majority
failed to include examples or to provide guidance as to what constitutes
such a hardship.2 4 s Given the dissenting opinions' concern with the se-
verity of solitary confinement, it is difficult to see how the majority dis-
missed this deprivation of freedom as easily as other trivialities of prison
life.2 49 The majority emphasized that the state expunged Conner's disci-
plinary charge eventually, thus removing any taint of discipline from his
record.25 ° This factor does little to correct the circumstances surrounding
Conner's punishment.25' Though negligible to a person unfamiliar with
the prison system, "atypical and significant hardship" may very well exist
245. Id. at 2309.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2300-02.
248. Id. at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Prisoners' Rights, supra note 241, at
141 (recognizing that the majority's decision "engenders a number of interpretive puz-
zles"); Bell, supra note 19, at 190 (stating that judges will know if "conditions of confine-
ment pass the bounds of civilized standards" when they see it) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (comparing the vague applications of the
obscenity test with determinations of prisoners' confinement)).
249. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301-03 (dismissing Conner's confinement as not being an
"atypical" or a "significant" deprivation).
250. Id. at 2301. During Supreme Court oral argument, one Justice categorized the act
of expungement by stating, "[y]ou cannot retroactively make it done administratively.
When it was done, it was done as a punishment." United States Supreme Court Official
Transcript, No. 93-1911, 1995 WL 117628 at *44, Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2293.
251. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the stigma that
attaches to an inmate assigned to disciplinary confinement); see supra notes 195-99 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's argument that solitary confinement
should be classified as a significant deprivation of liberty).
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in living a month of one's life in an environment that some believe to be
physically and emotionally harmful.25
2
Examining the nature of the prisoner's deprivation is far more consis-
tent with Due Process Clause jurisprudence; however, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's analysis of Conner's deprivation should have dictated the op-
posite result.253 Because of the Sandin majority's eagerness to re-em-
brace the Wolff standard, its decision ignored a significant footnote in
Wolff where the Court confronted explicitly the issue of solitary confine-
ment as a significant liberty interest. 4 The Wolff Court categorized soli-
tary confinement as punishment that "represents a major change in the
conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is
claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. 255
Additionally, the Wolff Court was careful to exclude more insignificant
penalties, such as the mere loss of privileges, from the same due process
protections.256 By separating significant hardships of the prison discipli-
nary system from mere penalties or inconveniences, the Wolff Court ad-
dressed the critical issue of what disciplinary action would constitute a
significant hardship and therefore, would demand a due process inquiry.
By abandoning the important contemplations of Wolff, the Sandin major-
ity ignored the severity of this type of solitary confinement and confused
prisoners' due process jurisprudence greatly.
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg adopted the former Wolff methodology
that examined the nature of the liberty interest, but categorized solitary
confinement as an "atypical and significant hardship" deserving of due
process protection.257 The nature of solitary confinement 258 cannot be
likened to asserting liberty interests in hot lunches as opposed to bag
252. See supra note 25 (discussing solitary confinement's potential for physical and
mental harm on an inmate).
253. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "majority's
reasoning ..., particularly when read in light of this Court's precedents, seems to me to
lead to the opposite conclusion").
254. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19 (contemplating as serious issues
both the deprivation of good-time credits and solitary confinement). The Wolff Court did
not, however, intend the procedures it set forth to be interpreted as "graven in stone." Id.
at 571-72.
255. Id. at 571-72 n.19.
256. Id. at 572 n.19. The Court stated that "[w]e do not suggest, however, that the
procedures required by today's decision for the deprivation of good time would also be
required for the imposition of lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges." Id.
257. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the confine-
ment "effected a severe alteration in the conditions of his incarceration").
258. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing solitary con-
finement as one of the primary "'traditional disciplinary tools' of our prison systems"),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). See supra note 25 (for an overview of the history of
solitary confinement and its physical and emotional effects on inmates).
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lunches or cells lacking sufficient television outlets. 259 By substantially
limiting access to federal courts and articulating an unworkable standard
for invoking a due process claim, the majority essentially equated the ex-
perience of one month in leg irons and solitude with a preference for hot
food2 60 and television.2 6 1
Additionally, Justice Breyer's position, advocating statutes as an im-
portant "touchstone" for determining liberty interests, raises compelling
concerns for the future of state regulations.E62 Although the majority ap-
pears to retain the statutory due process inquiry, the higher threshold
standard of "atypical and significant" hardship will most likely dominate
the lower court's analysis, "offering significantly less protection against
deprivation of liberty," even when the courts were willing to recognize a
liberty interest before Sandin.263 Justice Breyer recognized that the state
of prisoners' due process jurisprudence was in need of interpretation;
however, explicitly redefining the "lower definitional limit" of prisoners'
liberty concerns would have placed due process on its proper path with-
out abandoning recent precedent.264
B. The Future of Prisoners' Due Process Rights
In the twenty-one years separating Wolff and Sandin, the Court
changed the way it analyzes prisoners' due process inquiries greatly. Due
to a real concern for curbing unfettered discretion in prison administra-
tion, the Court in the 1970s began to involve itself in prisoners' cases to
259. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (discussing trivial prisoners' claims litigated under
the guise of liberty interests worthy of due process protections).
260. See Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an asserted liberty
interest in a hot lunch rather than a bag lunch); see also supra note 221 (illustrating the
wide range of liberty interests prisoners have asserted).
261. See Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 767-69 (8th Cir.) (claiming a liberty interest in
adequate television outlets in a cell), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984); see supra note 221
(illustrating cases in which inmates have claimed liberty interests in obvious trivialities).
262. See Prisoners' Rights, supra note 241, at 146-47. Critics of the majority's due pro-
cess reformulation have focused on the Court's failure to integrate state laws into the new
methodology, which ultimately "threaten[s] to eviscerate the unique character of state-
born interests." Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 182, at 31 (stating that since an "atypical
and significant" hardship is a "very strong candidate" for a liberty interest stemming from
the Constitution itself, "the state-created liberty interest approach is superfluous").
263. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306.
264. Id. at 2308. Prior to Sandin, many prisoners' decisions followed due process in-
quiries that focused on state statutes or regulations. See, e.g. Kentucky Dept. Of Correc-
tions v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
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defend individual justice.2 65 Although the methodology requiring scru-
tiny of prison regulations seemed to provide impetus for prisoner lawsuits
through a broad extension of statutory entitlements, the Supreme Court's
decision in Sandin may offer only a short-term remedy to this flood of
litigation.266 Its long-term effect will reduce severely the reality of pris-
oner "liberty." 267
Justice Ginsburg recognized aptly the great risk Sandin carries regard-
ing the future integrity of the Due Process Clause.268 By failing to re-
quire federal inquiry of liberty interests, a fundamental constitutional
provision is now dependent on local prison codes.269 Essentially, delegat-
ing to prison officials the power to decide the fate of prisoners' liberty
interests compromises constitutional principles. 270 But, even where state
legislatures and administrative agencies, together with prison officials,
have attempted to formulate regulations that "cabin" officials discretion,
the new "atypical and significant" standard most likely will dominate the
lower court's due process inquiries.27' By either standard, the future of
prisoners' due process rights undoubtedly will be affected by Sandin, and
265. See Call, supra note 9, at 36 (describing courts' growing concerns for abuse of
prisoners' constitutional rights as the decline of the "hands-off" period).
266. See Philip Hager, Should Inmatc. Suit Themselves?, CAL. LAW. May 1995, at 33-35.
Hager presents other practical solutions for the curbing the increase in prisoners lawsuits,
none of which advocate changing due process methodology. Id. Current plans to halt
prisoner litigation include: (1) new legislation that would deprive inmates of up to 30 days
of good-time credits for filing a frivolous lawsuit; (2) conferences between a judge, prison
officials, and the inmate by telephone, initiated after a complaint is filed, to resolve the
case, or in the alternative, to tighten the issues; and (3) imposing fees on prisoners who
choose to file lawsuits in order to lessen "the allure of 'free' litigation."
267. Erwin Chemerinsky, a University of Southern California law professor who helped
represent DeMont Conner, commented on the potential broad impact of Sandin stating,
"[i]f Rehnquist's opinion means what it seems to suggest, it could be a devastating blow for
prisoners' rights .... It's significant because these inmates have nowhere else to turn for
protection but the federal courts." David G. Savage, High Court Ruling Limits Inmate
Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at A12. Other journalists commenting on the impact
of the Sandin decision were not as sympathetic to this defeat for prisoners' due process
rights. One commentator reported to the public, "[s]ome inmate lawsuits have merit, and
can still win their day in court under the new Supreme Court standard. But most litigious
lawbreakers yelping that their rights have been violated made a career out of stomping on
other people's rights." Editorial, Frivolous Lawsuits: Reigning in 'Jailhouse Lawyers', CIN.
ENQUIRER, July 3, 1995, at A12.
268. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty in
defining "atypical and significant hardship").
269. Id. at 2303; see supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing Ginsburg's
analysis of the "Due Process Clause itself, not Hawaii's prison code, as the wellspring of
the protection due Conner").
270. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
271. See supra note 239 (describing Justice Breyer's concerns about the demise of due
process inquiry involving state statutes and regulations).
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may very well provide the catalyst for a return to the period before judi-
cial activism. 272  Justice Stevens's observation in his Meachum dissent
captures the essence of Justice Ginsburg's concern:
[I]f the inmate's protected liberty interests are no greater than
the State chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave
described in the 19th century cases. . . . [E]ven the inmate re-
tains an unalienable interest in liberty-at the very minimum
the right to be treated with dignity-which the Constitution may
never ignore.273
More importantly, the majority's decision does little to reconcile ambi-
guities in prisoners' due process cases. The Court's failure to articulate a
clear standard or to illustrate examples defining "atypical and significant
hardship," leaves the lower courts with no guidance in deciding future
prisoners' claims.274
In theory, a return to the liberty interest analysis set forth in Wolff and
Meachum is needed; otherwise for prisoners' claims rarely will survive
prison officials' interpretation of prison regulations. The conservative
Sandin majority, motivated in part by the overwhelming costs of prison-
ers' litigation, returned a decision that may discourage prisoners' suits
and alleviate the strain on court dockets, but will not necessarily repre-
sent a future image of "liberty" that is true to the Due Process Clause.275
Deferring discretion to state prison officials to assign their most serious
punishment presents a dangerous threat to the Due Process Clause's no-
tion of "liberty. ' 276 Because the goal of the prisoners' rights movement
272. See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 31 (concluding that the conservative Sandin ma-
jority did not intend to promote prisoners' due process rights "in any respect"); see also
Prisoners' Rights, supra note 241, at 150 (concluding that Sandin reflected the Court's
"concern for judicial economy and its lack of sympathy for prisoners' claims').
273. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg ques-
tioned the majority's failure to make the "atypical and significant" standard a workable
reality. Id. She concluded that the Court "ventures no examples, leaving consumers of the
Court's work at sea, unable to fathom what would constitute an 'atypical, significant depri-
vation.' " Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 134, at 236-37 (concluding that an unworkable
decision that leaves lower courts without guidance needs reform).
275. See Prisoners' Rights, supra note 241, at 150 (discussing the possibility that the
Sandin Court returned to earlier due process methodology in order to "weed out trivial
claims" and protect scarce judicial resources); see also Theodore Eisenberg, What Shapes
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (1989) (noting
that the litigation "explosion," particularly with § 1983 claims, is a constant pressure on
federal court judges and judicial funds); see generally Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases:
Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 21 (providing
recent statistics and commentary on the deluge of prisoners' lawsuits).
276. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the probable
effect of the majority's decision on the Due Process Clause).
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was to eradicate arbitrary and harmful treatment of inmates, 77 the ma-
jority's decision in Sandin sends the message to prisons that due process
is necessary only when officials see fit. Given the inherent tensions be-
tween inmates and prison administrators, it is possible that the history of
abuse also may repeat itself.2 78 The slippery slope of deference to prison
administrators is likely to make any expectation of retaining constitu-
tional rights after incarceration a fiction. In such instance, the harm that
deprivation can cause is so significant in the life of an incarcerated indi-
vidual that an unbiased, clear guideline like the Due Process Clause is
most necessary.
As a result of the negative effects of Hewitt, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court seized the opportunity in Sandin to steer due process
analysis down a different path. 79 The majority's return to Wolff and
Meachum, however, solved only part of the problem. By failing to recog-
nize Conner's liberty interest as worthy of due process protection, and
additionally failing to articulate a clear example of a deserving claim, the
majority fails to clarify the status of the prisoner Due Process law. 8°
IV. CONCLUSION
Sandin v. Conner represents a return to an analysis of the inmate's dep-
rivation, as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell,28 and the first step toward
embracing traditional, consistent notions of Due Process analysis. The
Court's abandonment of the Hewitt methodology, however, does little to
improve the clarity of due process jurisprudence and provides no guide-
lines for determining an "atypical and significant deprivation" requiring
due process protection. By failing to recognize Conner's solitary confine-
ment as a valid liberty interest, and providing courts with a standard that
requires extensive interpretation, the Court relegates a decision of im-
mense magnitude to prison officials' discretion and lower courts guess-
work. Effectively eliminating the federal court forum for a fair
adjudication of inmates' claims, the Sandin Court created a thirty-year
277. See generally RUDOVSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at xiii (summarizing prisoners'
rights judicial victories as combatting "major abuses and severe physical punishment" in
the prison system).
278. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing an overview of prisoners'
constitutional rights, traditional deference to prison administrators, and the factors that
sparked judicial attention toward prisoners' due process claims).
279. See supra notes 129-34 (discussing the negative effects of the Hewitt decision on
the landscape of prisoners' due process).
280. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
281. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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setback in prisoners' rights law and signaled to prisoners that their consti-
tutional claims may be forever "locked out" from judicial review.
Michelle C. Ciszak

